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THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION:  
A NEW APPROACH TO PROPERTY DEADLOCKS 
Amnon Lehavi§ 
  I. INTRODUCTION 
On April 21, 2016, music icon Prince Rogers Nelson was found dead 
of fentanyl overdose at Paisley Park, his studio complex outside of the 
City of Minneapolis, Minnesota. Prince had died intestate, and the 
challenge of administering his estate has been lingering since. This is 
because the estate was in a state of “personal and corporate mayhem” for 
a substantial period of time, as described in 2017 by the county district 
court judge overseeing the case.1 Only after over a year from his death did 
the court finally certify that Prince’s sister and five half-siblings were the 
rightful heirs to the estate in equal shares, based on Minnesota’s 
inheritance laws, and after it had thrown out about forty other contenders 
to the estate.2  
But the challenge of administering Prince’s estate has been going well 
beyond identifying the overall value of the estate (estimated in 2017 at 
around $200 million), paying the Internal Revenue Service and the State 
of Minnesota their share in taxes (which could amount to about a half of 
the estate’s worth),3 and dividing the remaining fortune between the six 
heirs. This is particularly so because much of the value of the estate lies 
in unreleased recordings that Prince kept hidden in two storage vaults at 
his studio, with most of the contents in the vaults not even catalogued at 
the time of Prince’s death.4 The vaults are said to contain hundreds of 
completely unheard songs in addition to multiple other materials.5 This 
means that the estate has to make principled decisions about which 
unpublished materials to release and which record companies to sign 
 
§ Dean and Atara Kaufman Professor of Real Estate, Harry Radzyner Law School, and Academic 
Director, Gazit-Globe Real Estate Institute, Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliya.  
 1. Ben Sisario, Disputes Over Prince’s Estate Throw the Future of His Vault into Question, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/25/arts/music/new-disputes-over-princes-
estate-cloud-the-future-of-his-vault.html.  
 2. Daniel Kreps, Prince Estate: Sister, Five-Half Siblings Named Heirs, ROLLING STONE (May 
20, 2017), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-news/prince-estate-sister-five-half-siblings-
named-heirs-193646/. 
 3. Steve Karnowski, As Prince Heirs Stew, Bankers and Lawyers Cash in on Estate, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Apr. 15, 2018), https://apnews.com/d9847863113d4ff8bd70850dd6a6cd2e/As-Prince-heirs-
stew,-bankers-and-lawyers-cash-in-on-estate.   
 4. Sisario, supra note 1. 
 5. David Browne, The Prince Estate’s Big Plans: Inside the Upcoming Purple Reign, ROLLING 
STONE (July 13, 2018), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-features/prince-estate-big-plans-
upcoming-purple-reign-698529. 
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contracts with. Additionally, particularly in regard to published music, the 
estate will have to make decisions about awarding “grand rights” 
(required for some types of public performances in which Prince’s 
repertoire would be used)6 as well as the licensing of copyright for 
movies, commercials, and so forth. In addition, the estate holds property 
rights to trademarks and, more generally, rights to merchandizing based 
on Prince’s right of publicity.7       
The first two years after Prince’s death have proven chaotic. For 
example, Bremer Trust, a Minneapolis bank appointed by the court soon 
after Prince’s death, signed a $31 million deal with Universal Music for 
rights to music that Prince started making in the mid-1990s, after his 
tenure with Warner Brothers (“WB”). But a few months later, Universal 
asked to void the contract once it learned that the rights conflicted with 
those granted to WB.8 Comerica Bank and Trust, appointed by the court 
to replace Bremer as the executor of the estate, then found itself in conflict 
with three of the six heirs on several fronts; for example, because of its 
decision to move the contents of Prince’s vaults from Paisley Park to Los 
Angeles. Although engaged in this internal strife, the six heirs showed 
rare unity in objecting in April 2018 to an “entertainment transaction” that 
Comerica sought to promote, which the heirs said would be “an 
embarrassment to Prince’s legacy.”9 During that period, the heirs did not 
receive a single cent, while Comerica and its lawyers collected $5.9 
million in fees and expenses.10    
Matters seem to have improved by mid-2018, with a deal signed in June 
2018 between Comerica and Sony Legacy for the rights to release the bulk 
of Prince’s back catalog, starting with the albums Prince published after 
he left WB in the mid-1990s. Beginning in 2021, Sony will also reissue 
the bulk of Prince’s WB albums.11 On September 21, 2018, the first album 
containing previously unpublished materials was released. It was based 
on a nine-song, 35-minute tape that Prince had made in 1983, which was 
found among the 8,000 cassettes in the vaults. The estate is advancing 
 
 6. Grand rights, when applicable, require direct consent/license from the copyright holder. This 
is unlike “small rights,” which are administered by collective organizations representing copyright 
holders, such as the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP). For the 
applicability of grand rights, see Brent Giles Davis, Note, Identity Theft: Tribute Bands, Grand Rights, 
and Dramatic-Musical Performances, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.  845, 868-75 (2006).      
 7. Prince’s right of publicity survived his death, under Minnesota law. See Tamera H. Bennett,  
Updates on Prince Estate - Heirs Determined; UMG Deal Voided; Possible Disputes Over Prince Stage 
Show, BENNETT LAW OFFICE: BLOG (Aug. 14, 2017), 
http://www.tbennettlaw.com/createprotect/2017/6/8/updates-on-prince-estate-heirs-determined-will-
umg-deal-be-voided-possible-dispute-over-prince-stage-show.  
 8. Sisario, supra note 1. 
 9. Karnowski, supra note 3. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Browne, supra note 5.  
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other deals, such as a merchandizing pact with the Minnesota Twins 
baseball team and other clothing and merchandizing deals with retailers.12 
 Interestingly, while the heirs and the estate’s professional advisers 
attested that they constantly keep in mind what Prince might have wanted 
to leave as his legacy, they nevertheless openly declared that this goal 
should be balanced with financially serving the estate. As suggested by 
Troy Carter, Spotify’s global head of creator services at the time, who 
was named in 2017 as the estate’s entertainment adviser: “If we went by 
‘we have to follow it to the T of exactly how Prince would do things,’ you 
can’t really do that and run an estate at the same time.”13 
 This case seems to entail a number of key insights, explored in detail 
in this Article. These insights demonstrate the challenge of collective 
action for some types of assets or estates while suggesting how trust 
governance can aid in alleviating conflicts among multiple beneficiaries.  
First, the fact that Prince did not write a will or otherwise devise a plan 
for the governance of his repertoire and other types of intellectual and 
physical property posthumously requires others—whether courts, the 
estate administrators, or heirs—to make such choices. Second, the initial 
appointment of an estate administrator prior to the certification of the 
heirs did not necessarily serve the estate well during this interim period, 
with agency problems manifesting themselves. Third, the certification of 
multiple heirs has led to internal conflicts that have gone beyond 
identifying the proper criteria for an equitable partition. In fact, the 
existence of multiple heirs underscored the challenge of running the entire 
estate to substantiate and increase its overall value. Fourth, and finally, 
the collective action only started to move forward at a later stage, in which 
a trustee, aided by capable advisers, started managing the estate under the 
court’s supervision, while being held accountable to a certified group of 
heirs.  
This does not mean, of course, that no friction might arise between the 
trustee and the beneficiaries, or alternatively, that multiple heirs can never 
be trusted to run an estate independently. But it does emphasize the 
potential advantages of a multi-beneficiary trust, at least for a certain 
period of time or for the duration of a specific project. This is especially 
so if the property is not readily divisible, and unified governance may 
work to prevent a deadlock among co-owners.  
These lessons are helpful outside of the somewhat idiosyncratic case 
of Prince’s estate. Trusts created ex ante or ex post to handle collective 
action problems may prove effective in a variety of settings involving 
multiple owners, beneficiaries, or other entitlement holders. This could be 
 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
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so for land, when different pieces of adjacent land must be assembled for 
redevelopment, or whenever the common governance of a multi-owned 
property cannot be advanced merely by direct bargaining or through an 
institution such as a homeowner association. This is also the case for 
various scenarios concerning intellectual property assets that cannot or 
should not be broken down into pieces and divided among co-owners. It 
might also apply to physical objects, such as artworks, cultural artifacts, 
or other tangible assets that are valuable as part of a collection, and for 
which conventional co-ownership may result in a deadlock.  
This Article argues that trust law can offer an institutional alternative. 
It would rely on the longstanding law and practice that governs the 
fiduciary administration of assets by a trustee in favor of multiple 
beneficiaries, while extending current doctrine that focuses on the multi-
beneficiary intergenerational trust to multiple contemporaneous 
beneficiaries. In addition to encouraging the voluntary creation of this 
mechanism, such as through the settling of an inter vivos or testamentary 
trust, statutory law should authorize courts in appropriate cases to grant a 
remedy of establishing a trust as a matter of law (ex lege). Turning co-
owners faced with a property deadlock into co-beneficiaries should not 
be considered a taking if properly devised and might prove less intrusive 
than other solutions, such as expropriation or a forced auction. 
The rest of the Article is structured as follows. Part II identifies the 
problem of potential deadlocks in the governance of assets. It frames the 
issue within the general challenge of collective action, which may pertain 
to situations involving multiple stakeholders in the same asset (commons) 
or adversely, fragmentation of private property rights that may hinder the 
efficient pooling or coordination of assets (anticommons). It then 
analyzes various situations in which the partition of the asset, or its sale 
and division of proceeds among the co-owners, is not a viable or efficient 
solution to resolve such deadlocks. Part III assesses current institutional 
solutions to property deadlocks among multiple stakeholders: direct 
governance by majority vote; incorporation and the transfer of asset 
ownership to the corporation; appointment of a receiver; and a forced 
preemption of rights, such as by eminent domain. Part IV introduces the 
key features of the common law trust and identifies the functional and 
organizational attributes of the fiduciary administration of property. It 
then illuminates the under-utilized potential of trust law in governing 
assets with multiple beneficiaries, such as through the duty of 
impartiality. Finally, this Article calls to expand the use of both voluntary 
trusts and ex lege trusts to foster collective action. 
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II. DEADLOCKS IN MULTI-PARTY PROPERTY GOVERNANCE 
A. Multiple Stakeholders, Commons, and Anticommons 
Various scenarios implicating multiple stakeholders, collective action, 
and asset governance have long preoccupied theory and practice. At one 
end, Garret Hardin’s work on the Tragedy of the Commons14 highlighted 
the ways in which an open-access regime—under which each person has 
a liberty to use a resource as he or she deems fit, but no right to prevent 
others from doing the same—will likely result in overuse of, 
underinvestment in, and the inevitable depletion of the resource.15 One 
prominent solution to this “tragedy” is privatization—moving assets from 
an open-access regime to a private property regime. According to Harold 
Demsetz, private property facilitates the internalization of costs and 
benefits pertaining to an asset, such that a self-interested action by the 
owner may also promote the overall efficient use of the asset.16 The clear 
identification of borders and right-holders allows for an effective ordering 
of asset use, even for those residual types of actions that may spill over to 
affect assets owned by others.17 
At the other end, “too much” private property could also be detrimental 
for effective asset governance and collective action. Under the 
anticommons theory, the over-fragmentation of private property rights 
can lead to inefficient and unjust results, from potential deadlocks among 
adjacent landowners concerning the restructuring of rights to allow for 
effective redevelopment, to the undersupply of biomedical innovation due 
to exclusive patents over fragments of knowledge.18  
Realizing that straightforward regimes of private property do not serve 
as a panacea for all types of asset-governance problems, scholars and 
policy-makers have become increasingly interested in other institutional 
alternatives for asset governance; namely, public property regimes,19 
 
 14. Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244 (1968). 
 15. Fifty years after its publication, Hardin’s insights about unmanaged resources preserve their 
dominant stance, despite some challenges about their theoretical and policy implications. See, e.g., The 
Cegla Ctr. for Interdisciplinary Research of the Law, The Tragedy of the Commons at 50: Context, 
Precedents, and Afterlife, 19(2) THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 395-703 (2018).   
 16. See generally Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 
(1967).   
 17. Id. at 356−59.   
 18. MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS 
MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES (Bill Frucht ed. 2008). This view has not remained 
uncontested. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Heller's Gridlock Economy in Perspective: Why There is Too 
Little, Not Too Much Private Property, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 51 (2011). 
 19. Authors have noted, for example, that general circulation and commerce routes have been 
historically supplied publicly, as is still generally the case today, given the high transaction costs of 
organizing a private system of easements, as well as the positive synergy or network effect of opening 
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common property regimes,20 and hybrid or mixed property regimes.21 In 
the context of this Article, particular attention should be paid to common 
property regimes (“CPRs”), also termed “limited common property 
regimes,”22 in which an identifiable group of persons collectively holds 
the formal property rights to an asset to the exclusion of nonmembers.  
Elinor Ostrom, a prominent academic voice endorsing CPRs as an 
institutional alternative for asset governance,23 identified their 
fundamental challenge: “how a group of principals who are in an 
interdependent situation can organize and govern themselves to obtain 
continuing joint benefits when all face temptations to free-ride, shirk, or 
otherwise act opportunistically.”24  
Ostrom outlined certain design principles that could aid groups in 
fostering collective action in CPRs over time, among them active 
monitoring within the group and graduated sanctions for violations of 
group rules.25 However, while close-knit groups—comprising a “social 
network whose members have credible and reciprocal prospects for the 
application of power against one another and a good supply of 
information on past and present internal events”26—are able to employ 
both formal and informal mechanisms for constant enforcement and 
reinforcement of norms, this may not be the case for most types of CPRs. 
Once members may exit the group freely, such that they are not bound by 
the infinite “repeat play” dynamics that may discipline group members,27 
they may be tempted to engage in various types of opportunistic 
behavior.28  
In particular, potential problems of deadlocks may thwart asset 
 
such routes to use by the general public. Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 
1381-82 (1993). Such rationales have also prompted calls to reconsider public governance models for 
modern channels of transportation and communication, including digital networks. See, e.g., Andrew N. 
Liaropoulos, Cyberspace Governance and State Sovereignty , in DEMOCRACY AND AN OPEN-
ECONOMY WORLD ORDER 25, 25-35 (George C. Bitros & Nicholas C. Kyriazis, eds., 2017).   
 20. See Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission 
Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 139 (1998). 
 21. See Amnon Lehavi, Mixing Property, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 137 (2008) (identifying 
different types of hybrids). 
 22. Rose, supra note 20, at 139. 
 23. Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action  
(James E. Alt & Douglass C. North eds.,1990). 
 24. Id. at 29. 
 25. Id. at 90.  
 26. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 177-78 
(Harv. Univ. Press 1991). 
 27. ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (Basic Books, Inc. 1984).  
 28. The challenge of devising a legal setting that would promote “liberal commons” -- preserving 
the right to exit while mitigating the potential for intragroup opportunism -- is one that looms large over 
such cooperative types of asset governance. See Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal 
Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 549, 553 (2001). 
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governance based either on a common property regime or, conversely, on 
a private property setup requiring the aggregation of consent from parties 
who each hold a fragment of the asset. This may be so not only because 
of free-riding, shirking, or other types of opportunism, as Ostrom has 
identified, but also because of genuine heterogeneity among the group 
members. The joint owners or stakeholders may simply fail to agree on a 
certain course of action for governing the asset because of diverging tastes 
and preferences, which span from different levels of risk-aversion or 
managerial styles to genuine disputes about the goals that the asset should 
serve. Should single homes on various plots of land be destroyed to make 
room for a more condensed redevelopment? Should copyrighted musical 
works of a deceased artist be licensed for a certain TV reality show that 
may be considered by some heirs as diminishing the artist’s reputation? 
Should a collection of artworks be displayed in a country that is willing 
to pay handsomely for the exhibition, but is much less generous on human 
rights? To the extent that differences are not merely tactical, the problem 
of deadlock may be particularly troublesome. The collective action 
problem intensifies when the asset cannot be partitioned among co-
owners or sold off to a third party while distributing the proceeds. This is 
so whether such division is practically impossible or would result in a 
major deadweight loss.   
B. Land Assembly and Multi-owned Properties 
In the context of land, collective action problems may manifest 
themselves in the mirror-image scenarios of commons (namely, a multi-
owner property) and anticommons (namely, fragmented ownership of 
adjacent pieces of land that are better served by their consolidation). Thus, 
while this Section focuses on the challenge of land assembly, and 
therefore looks mostly at anticommons scenarios, the basic tenets of such 
challenges relate also to commons. Accordingly, both scenarios face 
essentially the same types of potential deadlocks among stakeholders.  
  The challenge of land assembly has been traditionally linked with the 
establishment of public projects and the corresponding justification for 
granting government the power of eminent domain to take land for 
“public use” against payment of “just compensation.”29 Land assembly 
for projects, such as roads, navigable water routes, and other linear 
infrastructures and utilities, is prone to potential market failures. The 
market for the purchase of land, or for a right of way in land, is 
particularly thin because often there may be only one feasible route for 
 
 29. “… Nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. 
CONST. amend. V, cl. 4. 
7
Lehavi: The Law of Trusts and Collective Action
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2021
2021] THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION 395 
the project. This is especially true when the process of land assembly has 
already started such that path-dependency (literally speaking) makes 
irrelevant the option of looking for alternatives outside of the chosen 
route. Accordingly, persons owning land along the designated path may 
be incentivized to hold out.30  
But land assembly problems also arise in the context of essentially 
private, for-profit projects. This is so whether the project is advanced by 
a group of current landowners who wish to come together in amassing 
land for the purpose of self-initiated redevelopment, a private 
entrepreneur seeking to acquire land from multiple owners, or a local 
government that seeks to promote “economic development,” which may 
eventually translate into benefits to private developers.  
In some cases, land assembly is able to take place through a series of 
voluntary transactions. Thus, for example, in December 2015, Harvard 
University bought 19.6 acres of land in Allston, Massachusetts, for a 
combined $97.3 million, rounding out a fifteen-year process of 
assembling a 90-acre plot known as Allston Landing, formerly owned by 
the railroad company CSX Transportation Inc.31 With the “consolidation 
of land with one owner,” and the removal of the railways and other CSX 
structures,32 Harvard moved forward in November 2018 with setting up a 
land company, one that will oversee Harvard’s various projects on its 
growing campus in Allston.33  
In fact, the purchase of Allston Landing was preceded by an earlier 
series of land assembly transactions in Allston between 1988 and 1994, 
one that followed very different dynamics. During that earlier period, 
Harvard purchased 14 separate parcels totaling over 52 acres.34 Unlike the 
later Allston Landing land assembly, Harvard made the earlier purchases, 
at a total amount of $88 million, without revealing its identity to sellers, 
residents, or city officials. The university made the news public only in 
1997. Then-mayor Thomas Menin reacted furiously, writing to Harvard’s 
president that the secret acquisitions reflected “the highest level of 
arrogance seen in our city in many years.” 35 Harvard, on its part, argued 
 
 30. Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 74-77 (1986). 
 31. See Catherine Carlock, Harvard Completes Allston Landing Acquisition with $97M Land Buy, 
BOSTON BUS. J. (Dec. 16, 2015) https://www.bizjournals.com/boston/real_estate/2015/12/harvard-
completes-allston-landing-acquisition-with.html. The initial purchases from CSX were made in 2003, 
with these earlier agreements allowing CSX to continue using the property as an active rail yard, until 
CSX agreed in 2009 to the “yield up” of easements at the property and to the relocation of its rail 
operations. Id.  
 32. Id. 
 33. Press Release, Harv. Univ., Harv. Univ. to Establish Land Co. in Allston (Nov. 29, 2018), 
https://www.harvard.edu/media-relations/harvard-university-to-establish-land-company-allston.   
 34. Tina Cassidy & Don Aucoin, Harvard Reveals Secret Purchases of 52 Acres Worth $88m in 
Allston, BOSTON GLOBE (Jan. 10, 1997), https://www.newspapers.com/newspage/441985021/. 
 35. See Sara Rimer, Some Seeing Crimson at Harvard ‘Land Grab,’ N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 1997), 
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that “[w]e were really driven by the need to get these properties at fair 
market value’ and avoid ‘overly inflated acquisition costs.’”36 
The success of Harvard University in assembling land may also attest 
to the scenarios under which such projects may face anticommons 
hurdles. The first series of transactions in Allston moved forward because 
Harvard, being practically a single actor on the demand side, was able to 
keep quiet about the interrelated transactions in a move reminiscent of the 
strategy used by Walt Disney in the mid-1960s to secretly assemble over 
27,000 acres in Orlando.37 The second series of purchases relied on the 
fact that while Harvard acted overtly, it faced a willing buyer who had no 
internal conflicts in moving forward with the gradual process of assembly.  
In contrast, when either the demand side or the supply side of land 
assembly is not typified by unity, homogeneity, or effective divide-and-
rule dynamics, the possibility of authentic or strategic holdouts increases 
dramatically. Consider again the example of a group of adjacent 
landowners who try to come together to assemble land for the purpose of 
its redevelopment and its subsequent reapportionment. Internal conflicts 
on both sides of the transaction might hamper consensual land assembly, 
requiring the use of other mechanisms that facilitate collective action.  
The most dramatic and coercive mechanism is, of course, eminent 
domain. Part III-D will consider the use of eminent domain in the context 
of land assembly, vividly demonstrated in the seminal U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of New London, 38 which constitutionally 
authorized the use of eminent domain. It will address the political and 
legal backlash of this decision, and subsequent calls in the literature to 
replace straightforward eminent domain with alternative mechanisms that 
will resolve property deadlocks through a lesser degree of coercion.  
C. Intellectual Property and its (Re)composition   
As is the case with land, deadlocks may occur in the governance of 
intangible assets, such as creative works or technological innovations, 
which are protected by intellectual property rights. Collective action 
problems may result from either commons or anticommons dynamics.  
Consider first a potential deadlock in a commons setting. This may 
result from a lack of consent among co-owners or joint controllers of an 
 
https://www.nytimes.com/1997/06/17/us/some-seeing-crimson-at-harvard-land-grab.html.  
 36. See Cassidy & Aucoin, supra note 34. 
 37. See RICHARD E. FOGELSON, MARRIED TO THE MOUSE: WALT DISNEY WORLD AND ORLANDO 
34–53 (Yale Univ. Press 2001); Mark Andrews, Disney Assembled Cast of Buyers to Amass Land Stage 
for Kingdom, ORLANDO SENTINEL (May 30, 1993), https://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/os-xpm-
1993-05-30-9305280833-story.html. For the importance of secrecy in promoting land assembly, see 
Amnon Lehavi, Property and Secrecy, 50 REAL PROP., TR. & EST. L. 381, 425-31 (2016).  
 38. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
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asset, protected by an intellectual property right, about its proper use. An 
example of such deadlock is demonstrated above in the context of 
Prince’s musical repertoire.  
The magnitude of the commons problem is obviously implicated by the 
background legal rules, addressing questions such as whether one (or 
more) of the co-owners is entitled to use the protected asset, license its 
use to a third party, or assign his or her rights in it, without requiring the 
consent of the other co-owners of the patent, copyright, or trademark. To 
the extent that a co-owner is entitled to act unilaterally in this manner, 
then such a rule alleviates the potential for a fully blown deadlock 
preventing any exploitation of the asset.  
At the same time, unilateral actions can generate other types of 
collective action problems. This is so, for example, when concurrent or 
even conflicting licenses to the same asset, issued by each one of the co-
owners to different licensees—in a legal regime that allows for such 
unilateral measures—might hinder the overall efficient use of the asset. 
Even though information or technology is considered as an essentially 
non-rivalrous asset (allowing multiple parties to use it simultaneously, 
unlike most physical goods), the commercial exploitation ‘downstream’ 
of such an asset can be rivalrous, such that concurrent or conflicting 
licenses or other forms of downstream uses can result in inefficient over-
exploitation. This, in turn, may adversely affect the willingness of parties 
to engage in the joint process of creation or innovation in the first place. 
It also means that the benefits and costs of unilateral uncoordinated use 
should be weighed against the respective cost-benefit analysis of a rule 
that requires consensus among all co-owners of an intellectual property 
right for asset use or commercial exploitation.39  
The doctrine on this matter diverges among legal systems and may also 
change, within a single system, in regard to the specific type of 
intellectual property right. For example, in the case of patents, U.S. 
federal law generally allows each co-owner to freely use the patent-
protected asset, grant a non-exclusive license to use it, or assign his or her 
right to a third party without requiring the consent of other co-owners or 
being obliged to account for his or her profits from doing so.40 In contrast, 
in most countries within the European Union, national legal systems place 
limits on the ability of a co-owner to act in such a unilateral fashion, such 
that, in countries like Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, a co-
owner of a patent cannot license the patent, even non-exclusively, without 
 
 39. Andrea Fosfuri, Christian Helmers & Catherine Roux, Shared Ownership of Intangible 
Property Rights: The Case of Patent Coassignments, 46 J. LEGAL STUD. 339, 339-40, 365-66 (2017). 
 40. 35 U.S.C. § 262. See Lorenza Ferrari Hofer et al., The Impact of Co-Ownership of Intellectual 
Property Rights on their Exploitation, 3-5 (Int’l Ass’n for the Prot. of Intellectual Prop., Report of Swiss 
Group Q 194, 2009).  
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the consent of the other co-owners.41        
Further, within the United States, federal law diverges on the rules 
pertaining to legal relations among co-owners based on the specific type 
of intellectual property right. Thus, whereas in the case of patents, a co-
owner is entitled to unilaterally grant to a third party a non-exclusive 
license and is not required to share in the profits from doing so, in the case 
of copyrights, a co-owner who grants such a non-exclusive license has the 
duty to account to the other co-owners for their ratable share of the profits 
from the license.42 The situation is less clear-cut in the case of trademarks, 
where the very idea of joint ownership is in tension with the fundamental 
purpose of identifying a single entity’s goods or services in commerce, 
and is generally viable only where the co-owners have an institutional 
structure in place to ensure joint control over the use of the market. 
Whereas under U.S. federal law, a co-owner does not infringe on other 
co-owners’ rights by exercising his or her right to use the trademark, the 
law is silent on whether a co-owner is entitled to unilaterally license use 
of the trademark to a third party, and if so, whether such a co-owner is 
accountable to others for their ratable share of the profits. Such questions 
are thus governed by state law and are still unsettled among many state 
courts.43      
Another set of potential deadlock scenarios is driven by the mirror-
image problem of anticommons, under which various persons or 
corporations each hold an intellectual property right to a distinctive piece 
of work, design, technological innovation, etc. This fragmentation of 
property rights may make it difficult for the different parties—and even 
more so for a third party—to assemble the different assets for purposes of 
an integrative research, technology, or production. This could be so, for 
example, when the creator of a documentary movie needs to assemble 
licenses for use of video footage from different archives, agencies, media 
outlets, etc.  
The problem of anticommons in intellectual property arises 
prominently in the context of biomedical innovations protected by 
patents. In their 1998 article, Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg 
argue that awarding intellectual property rights, and in particular patents 
on ‘upstream’ biomedical innovation, could block others from conducting 
integrative research or developing applicative ‘downstream’ products 
essential for medical treatment.44 This would be so particularly when 
individual patents are awarded on concurrent fragments of technology or 
 
 41. Fosfuri, Helmers & Roux, supra note 39, at 345-46. 
 42. Melville Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright §§ 6.10-6.11 (Melville Nimmer et al., eds., 2018).  
 43. Hofer, supra note 40.  
 44. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons 
in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698 (1998). 
11
Lehavi: The Law of Trusts and Collective Action
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2021
2021] THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION 399 
knowledge (such as DNA sequences), or when owners of distinctive 
pieces of upstream research grant overlapping and inconsistent licenses 
of use to multiple downstream producers.45  
In a 2018 Science article, reviewing “The Anticommons at 20,” Jorge 
Contreras shows that such concerns over the effects of anticommons in 
biomedical research may have been overstated. This is so because the 
biomedical sector has found ways for voluntary outpouring of valuable 
discoveries to the public domain, such as in the 1996 Bermuda Accord 
reached by leaders of the Human Genome Project (HGP) and the 2007 
“Nine Points” set of principles for information-sharing, subscribed to by 
more than one-hundred leading universities and research institutes around 
the world.46 Moreover, at least in the United States, it has become 
increasingly difficult to patent basic biomedical discoveries, especially 
after the U.S. Supreme Court’s series of recent decisions, by which 
“products of nature” or “mental processes” are not eligible for patent 
protection. That said, biomedical research may still be prone to other 
types of anticommons problems, for example, because valuable data may 
be protected by trade secrets rather than by patents.47 Property deadlocks 
thus remain a concern in the context of intellectual property rights.   
D. Tangible Collections: Artwork, Archeology, and Other Gems 
Another property setting, in which both commons and anticommons 
problems may lead to property deadlocks, concerns artwork, 
archeological artifacts, and other tangible assets that have a particular 
value as part of a collection, or that are otherwise substantively 
interconnected.  
This could be so when an amalgamation of assets is jointly owned by 
a group of persons, such as heirs of a deceased artist’s estate, thus 
implicating potential problems of internal governance and even deadlock 
in the joint management of the estate (i.e., a commons problem). 
Alternatively, collective action problems may occur when different 
parties each hold proprietary or controlling rights to fragments or to 
distinctive assets, thus creating a challenge for their potential assembly—
embodying an anticommons scenario. As suggested briefly in this 
Section, trust or trust-like mechanisms could alleviate at least part of these 
collective action problems. 
As presented in the Introduction, joint heirs of an artist’s estate may 
come across various collective action problems. Even for physical assets 
 
 45. Id. at 699-700. 
 46. Jorge L. Contreras, The Anticommons at 20: Concerns for Research Continue, 361 SCI. 335, 
336 (2018). 
 47. Id. at 336-37.  
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that can be divided or partitioned among the various heirs, the co-owners 
would have to agree on the value of the various items and the specific 
allocation of assets for each co-owner. The five heirs of Pablo Picasso, 
who died intestate in 1973, while leaving behind about 45,000 works, 
went through six years of bitter negotiations at an overall cost of $30 
million prior to reaching a settlement about the division of the estate.48 
Interestingly, the division of Picasso’s works also involved the French 
government, which agreed to accept works of art in lieu of estate taxes.49 
High-profile sagas in relation to the allocation and administration of 
estates involved other prominent artists—as with the case of American 
painter Mark Rothko, causing a particularly notable legal and public 
outrage.50 
In addition to the potential division of the physical works among co-
heirs or co-owners, other assets related to the estate cannot be partitioned 
and, therefore, require continuous governance. In the case of Picasso, his 
son Claude Picasso, who had been named legal administrator of Picasso’s 
estate by a French court, created the Picasso Administration in 1996.51 
This organization acts for and on behalf of “Succession Picasso” or 
“Indivision Picasso” (‘indivision’ being a form of joint ownership under 
French law).52 The Picasso Administration manages the assets that remain 
indivisible: rights to Picasso’s reproductions and exhibitions; issuance of 
merchandizing licenses for the use of Picasso’s name, image, autograph, 
 
 48. Milton Esterow, The Battle for Picasso’s Multi-Billion-Dollar Empire, VANITY FAIR (Mar. 7, 
2016), https://www.vanityfair.com/culture/2016/03/picasso-multi-billion-dollar-empire-battle.  
 49. These works included “203 paintings, 158 sculptures, 88 ceramics, nearly 1,500 drawings, 
more than 1,600 prints, and 33 sketchbooks.” Id. This transfer to the French government formed the core 
collection of the Picasso Museum in Paris. Id.   
 50. See, e.g., Harriet Fitch Little, How an Artist’s Legacy Became Big Business, FINANCIAL TIMES, 
(Aug. 26, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/d77d5e74-69e5-11e6-ae5b-a7cc5dd5a28c; LEE SELDES, 
THE LEGACY OF MARK ROTHKO: AN EXPOSÉ OF THE GREATEST ART SCANDAL OF OUR CENTURY (Da 
Capo Press, Inc. 1978). In 1968 -- two years prior to killing himself in his Manhattan studio -- Mark 
Rothko wrote a will, leaving all of his residual estate (including nearly 700 of his paintings) to a non-
profit foundation he had organized, engaging three of his friends as executors, with the key purpose of 
keeping the estate intact such that it would not be atomized. In 1969, Rothko entered an agreement with 
the Marlborough Gallery, in which he agreed not to sell any works for a period of eight years, other than 
to Marlborough, under a separate agreement that was to be entered into, but was never done. Following 
his death, and that of his wife Mary Alice a few months later, the executors broke up Rothko’s estate, 
selling a large part of it to Marlborough at extremely low prices, and giving the gallery the right to sell 
other works on consignment for higher than normal commissions. A year later, Rothko’s then 20-year-
old daughter Kate sued on behalf of herself and her younger brother. The court ruled in favor of the 
children -- exposing the wrongful self-dealing of the executors and the gallery -- but the damage was done. 
Many of Rothko’s paintings had already been sold by the gallery to collectors and could not be returned. 
Id.      
 51. See Picasso Administration, “Rights,” PICASSO,  http://picasso.fr/en/rights (last visited July 3, 
2020). 
 52. The legal status of indivision is governed by the provisions of Article 815-1 and 1873 of the 
French Civil Code.   
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etc.; responsibility for authentication of Picasso’s work, while fighting 
against misattributions, forgeries, and so forth; and other issues relating 
to the management of Picasso’s estate as a whole, including his legacy 
and reputation.53 The Picasso Administration, operating as an 
administrative trust-like entity for the benefit of the heirs as a group, is an 
essential tool for collectively managing the indivisible parts of Picasso’s 
estate while also streamlining the occasional reassembly of divided parts 
of the estate, such as when Picasso’s physical works are loaned for the 
purpose of a retrospective exhibition. 
Assembling distinctive works of art from different right-holders, such 
as museums, collectors or heirs, for purposes of a retrospective exhibition 
or another integrative project, is a challenge that highlights the potential 
anticommons problems that often involve cultural or artistic assets.  
Probably the best-known example illustrating the inherent value of 
tangible goods as a collection or an entirety, alongside the multiple facets 
of anticommons problems involved with such assembly or coordination, 
is that of the Parthenon marbles, taken from the 5th century BC temple 
dedicated to the goddess Athena, located on top of the Acropolis Hill in 
Athens, Greece.  
The Parthenon marbles are currently split between the Acropolis 
Museum located at the footsteps of the Acropolis Hill and the British 
Museum in London. The source of the split lies in the period between 
1801 and 1805, when Lord Elgin, a British diplomat in then-Ottoman-
ruled Athens, took 247 feet of frieze from the Parthenon comprising fifty-
six blocks and nineteen statutes under a dubious claim of permission 
granted by Ottoman authorities. Elgin shipped the marbles to Britain and 
sold them in 1816. The British Museum eventually acquired the 
marbles.54  
Despite longstanding diplomatic efforts by the Greek government, 
amplified over the past few years, especially following the inauguration 
of the new Acropolis Museum in 2009, the British Museum has been 
reluctant to negotiate any such return or a long-term loan that would allow 
presentation of the collection in its entirety. In a 2019 interview, the 
director of the British Museum, Hartwig Fischer, insisted that the “the 
objects that are part of the collection of the British Museum are in 
fiduciary ownership of the Trustees of the Museum,” and that the 
placement of the Elgin marbles in a “museum of the world, for the world” 
 
 53. Esterow, supra note 48; See also Sara Hamdan, Lawsuits, Forgeries and Family Feuds: The 
Afterlives of Famous Artists, CNN (Mar. 31, 2017), https://edition.cnn.com/style/article/afterlives-of-
famous-artists-estates/index.html.  
 54. Kerry Kolasa-Sikiaridi, The History of the Parthenon Marbles, GREEK REP. (Jan. 27, 2019), 
https://greece.greekreporter.com/2019/01/27/the-history-of-the-parthenon-marbles/.  
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should be rather viewed as a “creative act.”55 This stance sparked a fierce 
response from the Greek Government, with the Culture Minister Myrsini 
Zorba calling Fisher a “cynic,”56 and the director of the Acropolis 
Museum arguing that “everything that is inextricably linked to the 
monument should be reunited.”57 This position has received support from 
prominent archeologists and other professionals. American archeologist 
Stephen Miller argues that the collection “deserves to be all together in 
one place,” that splitting it is “not the way to treat such an important 
monument,” and adding ironically that “we should persuade the Greeks 
to send the Parthenon to England.”58  
Obviously, the story of the Parthenon marbles is exceptional in the 
scale of the conflict, the parties involved, and the history of property 
rights (or claims thereto); but it does illustrate the unique sense in which 
certain types of tangible assets, such as archeological artifacts, artworks, 
and other objects may have a particular value as a collection, and how 
collective action problems may undermine their overall social value and 
could even result in a property deadlock.  
III. CURRENT (LIMITED) SOLUTIONS TO PROPERTY DEADLOCKS 
Having identified in Part II various settings in which multiple 
stakeholders may come across collective action problems, whether in the 
 
 55. Benjamin Butterworth, British Museum ‘Rules Out’ Returning Elgin Marbles to Greece, IN 
NEWS (Jan. 26, 2019), https://inews.co.uk/news/british-museum-elgin-marbles-not-return-greece-250841 
; Naomi Rea, The British Museum Says It Will Never Return the Elgin Marbles, Defining their Removal 
as a ‘Creative Act,’ ARTNET NEWS (Jan. 27, 2019), https://news.artnet.com/art-world/british-museum-
wont-return-elgin-marbles-1449919 ; Mark Brown, British Museum Chief: Taking the Parthenon Marbles 
was ‘Creative,’ THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 28, 2019), 
https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2019/jan/28/british-museum-chief-taking-the-parthenon-
marbles-was-creative.   
 56. Anthee Carassava, Have the UK and Greece Lost their Marbles?, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Feb. 21, 
2019), https://www.dw.com/en/have-the-uk-and-greece-lost-their-marbles/a-47580973. 
 57. Acropolis Museum Director: British Museum is Not Owner of the Parthenon Marbles , 
EKATHIMENRI NEWS (Mar. 27, 2019), 
https://www.ekathimerini.com/237178/article/ekathimerini/news/acropolis-museum-director-british-
museum-is-not-owner-of-parthenon-marbles; George Vardas, The British Museum and the Creative 
Displacement of the Parthenon Marbles, NEOS KOSMOS (Jan. 30, 2019), 
https://neoskosmos.com/en/128306/the-british-museum-and-the-creative-displacement-of-the-
parthenon-marbles/. 
 58. Kostis Geropoulos, Miller: Bring the Marbles Back or Send the Parthenon to Britain, NEW 
EUROPE (Feb. 11, 2019), https://www.neweurope.eu/article/miller-bring-the-marbles-back-or-send-the-
parthenon-to-britain/. A minority of commentators sees merit, however, in keeping the Parthenon marbles 
split. See Jonathan Jones, Let’s Not Lose our Marbles over the British Museum’s Boss’s Remarks, THE 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.neweurope.eu/article/miller-bring-the-marbles-back-or-send-
the-parthenon-to-britain/; Florian Schmidt-Gabain, My Solution to the Parthenon Marbles – Let’s Split 
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form of a commons setting or the mirror-image one of an anticommons, 
this Article analyzes in this Part different legal mechanisms that are 
currently in operation and the extent to which these mechanisms are able 
to resolve potential property deadlocks.  
A. Direct Governance by Majority Voting  
Legal regimes relating to joint tenants, tenants in common, 
coparceners, and other forms of joint owners or stakeholders must address 
potential differences of opinion within the group and establish rules of 
decision about control and use of the jointly-owned assets in such 
scenarios.  
In many cases, the most practical way to overcome disagreement is 
simply by splitting the asset. This could be done either by partition in kind 
of the asset or by sale and the division of the proceeds among the joint 
owners based on their ratable shares. When the parties cannot agree on 
partition, each party is entitled to apply for a court-ordered action of 
partition, with the court regularly having equitable discretion to determine 
the type of partition: in kind or by sale.59 
In other cases, such as when neither party applies for partition, or when 
partition is otherwise legally constrained, impractical, or outright 
detrimental to all parties concerned, legal doctrine must otherwise balance 
between the interests of the co-owners. In particular, rules on governance 
and use of the joint asset must work to foster effective use of the asset, 
and to prevent holdouts, freeriding, and other types of opportunistic 
behavior by any of the co-owners. Even in the case of two co-owners 
holding an equal share, disparities may arise in the actual power of the 
parties (consider joint tenancy or tenancy in common by former spouses). 
In the case of more than two co-owners, a related policy question arises 
concerning the scope and limits of majority rule among co-owners in 
decisions about the management and use of the joint asset. Such dilemmas 
relate not only to the validity of any such nonconsensual decisions, but 
also to the duty of co-owners to account to other co-owners for rents or 
profits received from third persons, or for benefits accrued to co-owners 
from possessing or otherwise using the joint asset. 
As Part II-C showed in the context of intellectual property, legal 
doctrine on these questions diverges among legal systems, such that in 
most European countries, consent among patent co-owners is required for 
licensing the patent to third parties; while in the United States, one or 
more patent co-owners can do so non-consensually without even having 
to account to other co-owners (whereas U.S. copyright law allows for 
 
 59. See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 405-14 (Jesse Dukeminier ed. 8th ed. 2018).  
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non-consensual licensing but does impose a duty of account among co-
owners). Therefore, while European law generally seeks to control 
against opportunism in the form of non-consensual exploitation of the 
asset and profit-grabbing, it opens the door to a different kind of 
opportunism in the form of holdouts and risk of deadlocks. U.S. patent 
law offers a mirror-image system of balancing, with U.S. copyright law 
trying to walk a middle ground between increasing the prospects of asset-
use while imposing profit-sharing.60  
Moving to the law governing joint tenancy, tenancy in common, and 
coparceners in land, statutory and case law in common law jurisdictions 
generally distinguish between unilateral possession and self-use of the 
asset by a joint owner, and receipt of revenues from third parties.  
Generally speaking, when a co-owner possesses or otherwise uses the 
asset, he or she is not liable to other co-owners and does not have to 
account to the co-tenants out of possession for the proportionate share of 
the rental value or other benefits.61 This is so unless such a co-owner 
engages in ousting other co-owners—i.e., excluding them or otherwise 
refusing their demand for use and enjoyment of the land. Also, under 
certain circumstances, the court may impose fiduciary duties among co-
owners, such as when the co-owners are family members.62  
In contrast, when one or more co-owners receive rent or other types of 
benefits from third parties, they must account to other co-owners for the 
amounts received in excess of their share. Therefore,an action taken by a 
co-owner, such as renting the land to a third party, without the consent of 
other co-owners, is not null and void. Rather, the rent is subject to 
accounting and rent-sharing.63 
The question of rules of decision in the absence of consent among co-
owners, and in particular about the power of a majority of co-owners to 
make decisions that would also bind a dissenting minority, comes up 
prominently in the context of common interest developments (“CIDs”), 
comprising mostly condominiums, cooperatives, and homeowner 
associations.64 
 
 60. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text. 
 61. W.W. Allen, Annotation, Accountability of Cotenants for Rents and Profits or Use and 
Occupation, 51 A.L.R. 2d. 388 (1957).  
 62. DUKEMINIER, supra note 59, at 418-19 
 63. W.W. Allen, supra note 61, § 2. 
 64. For an analysis of the various types of residential community associations, also termed 
“common interest communities” (CICs), see DUKEMINIER, supra note 59, at 873-94; Stephen E. Barton 
& Carol J. Silverman, History and Structure of the Common Interest Community, in COMMON INTEREST 
COMMUNITIES: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 3, 4 (Stephen E. Barton & Carol J. 
Silverman eds., 1994); Amnon Lehavi, Law, Collective Action and Culture: Condominium Governance 
in Comparative Perspective, 23 ASIA PAC. L. REV. 5 (2015); Amnon Lehavi, The Culture of Private Law, 
45 REAL EST. L.J. 35, 73-84 (2016). 
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  The types of collective action challenges faced by members of CIDs, 
and condominiums in particular, may be roughly divided into (1) 
establishment and management of jointly owned amenities, and (2) 
control of intra-CID externalities resulting from the use of the housing 
units.65  
To meet these challenges, the core of the horizontal collective action 
among homeowners and co-owners of common property lies in the CID’s 
governing documents, typically comprised of “declarations” containing a 
set of conditions, covenants, and restrictions (“CC&Rs”), which are 
recorded with the land registrar.66 The governing documents and 
subsequent amendments, rules, and regulations adopted by the CID go 
well beyond conventional contractual provisions. This is so because under 
enabling legislation, individually owned units are “burdened by a 
servitude that imposes an obligation that cannot be avoided by nonuse or 
withdrawal.”67 Under such statutes, the CC&Rs and subsequent 
association rulemaking are considered “enforceable equitable servitudes, 
unless unreasonable.”68 Such provisions do not require actual notice once 
registered and apply to subsequent purchasers, even if these provisions 
would not have otherwise fulfilled the “common law requirements for 
creation of an equitable servitude or a restrictive covenant.”69    
Decision-making rules come into play in the face of disagreements 
among CID members. In principle, unless expressly limited by statute or 
the CC&Rs, simple majority is effective to amend the declarations or to 
otherwise adopt rules, such as to “make administrative changes 
reasonably necessary for management of the common property” or to 
“prohibit or materially restrict uses of individually owned lots or units 
that threaten to harm or unreasonably interfere with the reasonable use 
and enjoyment of other property in the community.”70  
In contrast, unanimous consent is required for those prohibitions or 
material restrictions of individual uses that cannot be grounded in 
common interest or for changes made to the basis for allocating voting 
rights or assessments among community members. Also, when an 
 
 65. For a fuller analysis of these realms of collective action, see LEE ANNE FENNELL, THE 
UNBOUNDED HOME: PROPERTY VALUES BEYOND PROPERTY LINES 67-95 (Yale U. Press 2009).  
 66. These provisions regularly concern “membership and voting rights in the owners association, 
maintenance responsibilities, procedures for calculating and collecting assessments, accounting and 
insurance requirements, architectural and/or design control, and enforcement of the declaration.” Pinnacle 
Museum Tower Ass’n v. Pinnacle Mkt. Dev. (US), LLC, 145 Cal.Rptr.3d 514, 523-24 (2012). 
 67. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 6.2 (2000) (hereinafter: Restatement, 
Servitudes). 
 68. CAL. CIV. CODE §1354(a) (repealed 2014). Other state statutes may define the standard of 
enforcement of such servitudes somewhat differently. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: 
SERVITUDES § 6.8, statutory note (2000). 
 69. Pinnacle, 145 Cal.Rptr.3d, at 525.  
 70. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES, §6.10 (2000). 
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amendment does not apply uniformly to similar lots, the amendment must 
be approved by the members whose distinct interests would be adversely 
affected by it.71  
In practice, however, courts tend to broadly construe enabling 
legislation and declarations to settle for simple majority to amend the 
declaration or to promulgate new rules. In Villa De Las Palmas 
Homeowners Association v. Terifaj,72 the California Supreme Court 
upheld a majority-approved amendment to the condominium’s 
declarations imposing a no-pet restriction by viewing such a use 
restriction as “crucial to the stable, planned environment of any shared 
ownership arrangement” and holding that all homeowners, including 
those who purchased their units prior to the amendment, are bound by it.73 
The court read Section 1355(b) of California’s Civil Code on declaration 
amendments as settling for simple majority, reasoning it is designed to 
prevent a “small number of holdouts from blocking changes regarded by 
the majority to be necessary to adapt to changing circumstances and 
thereby permit the community to retain its vitality over time.”74 This 
provision was viewed by the court as presumptively reasonable.75 
While in a limited number of instances, courts exhibit a more 
interventionist approach—such as in scrutinizing restrictions on 
individual political speech within the CID76—majority voting by 
members regularly enjoys broad deference. In legitimizing simple 
majority voting as the only practical way to facilitate collective action, 
the law implicitly assumes that members are equal in their ability to 
influence decisions, that coalitions are only formed ad hoc, and that the 
majority does not systematically enjoy benefits that a minority does not.  
But other cases may raise doubts about whether a group of co-owners 
becomes controlled by a pre-organized majority, which serves the 
interests of a sub-group at the expense of others. Restrictions on pets, 
smoking, certain kinds of outdoor activities, and the like would not 
implicate “suspect classes” or otherwise raise constitutional issues. But 
these types of decisions could create over the long run a relatively stable 
majority, which is at least somewhat coordinated in acting vis-à-vis 
dissenters. This means that, at least in some instances, direct governance 
 
 71. Id.  
 72. 90 P.3d 1223 (Cal. 2004). 
 73. Id. at 1228-29. 
 74. Id. at 1228 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 6.10 cmt. A (2000)). 
 75. This shifts the burden to the party challenging the use restriction, who must show that these 
restrictions are “wholly arbitrary, violate a fundamental public policy, or impose a burden on the use of 
affected land that far outweighs any benefit.” Id. at 1231 (citing Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo Ass’n, 
878 P.2d 1275, 1287 (Cal. 1994)).  
 76. Amnon Lehavi, Concepts of Power: Majority Control and Accountability in Private Legal 
Organizations, 8 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 1, 53 (2014). 
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by majority vote may not prove an efficient and fair tool for collective 
action. 
Moreover, CIDs and condominiums in particular, are an exception in 
the overall landscape of co-tenancy and other forms of common 
ownership in the sense that CIDs are based on a built-in form of 
association and organizational structure, which is created by the real-
estate developer and to which homeowners must adhere prior to buying 
property. As such, the CID’s institutional structure allows for rules of 
governance that in other cases may require ex post incorporation.  
B. Incorporation   
The corporation is a prominent legal mechanism that seeks to promote 
collective action in the control and use of assets. As this Section shows, 
while the underlying rationales for creating the institution of corporations 
lies in resolving potential fragmentation and anticommons problems, the 
corporation’s governance mechanisms work also to alleviate commons 
problems that may result once a cluster of assets is consolidated under a 
single legal entity with multiple shareholders. At the same time, creating 
and governing a formal corporation is not trivial, and it is not a panacea 
for all types of collective action problems and deadlocks presented in Part 
II. 
In The Nature of the Firm,77 Ronald Coase observed that firms emerge 
as an alternative mode of operation to markets, whereby an organization 
is formed to direct resources within the organization rather than relying 
on external market transactions that may be prone to transaction costs and 
strategic behavior.78 Following Coase, Kenneth Arrow identified 
corporations as typified by “vertical integration,” referring to nonmarket 
resource allocation by organizational fiat.79 Oliver Williamson further 
explains that vertical integration allows for adaptive, sequential decision-
making without the need to “consult, complete or revise interfirm 
agreements,” such that “[w]here a single ownership entity spans both 
sides of the transaction, a presumption of joint profit maximization is 
warranted.”80 Incorporation can thus alleviate anticommons problems. 
At the same time, once the corporation has been formed, and capital or 
in-kind contributions by multiple parties are converted into shareholding, 
 
 77. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).  
 78. See generally, id. at 388 (suggesting that firms serve as “islands of conscious power in this 
ocean of unconscious co-operation.”)  (citing D.H. ROBERTSON, THE CONTROL OF INDUSTRY 85 (1923)). 
 79. Kenneth J. Arrow, The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of 
Market versus Non-market Allocations, in PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AND POLICY ANALYSIS 59, 67 
(R.H. Havenman & J. Margolis eds., 1970).  
80. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, 
RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 78 (1985). 
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the legal institutions of corporations must devise modes of effective 
rulemaking and governance to overcome potential commons problems 
among shareholders and other corporate insiders. This is achieved by 
three types of mechanisms.   
1. Transfer of Assets to the Separate Legal Entity.  
First, in creating the corporation, members move privately-owned 
assets or property rights to the organization, or otherwise contribute to 
establishing resources governed by the collective entity, against non-fixed 
claims in the form of shares. The corporation’s separate legal entity plays 
a key role in solidifying and ensuring the credibility of the commitment 
made by each individual equity shareholder to transfer direct control over 
the now-collectively-governed assets. In particular, Henry Hansmann and 
Reinier Kraakman view “asset partitioning” —by which the corporation’s 
assets are separated from those of the firm’s shareholders and, 
accordingly, from the personal creditors of the latter—as the “core 
defining characteristic of a legal entity” and as the essential role of 
organizational law.81  
2. Delegation of Decision-Making Powers to Agents.  
The second organizational feature of devising mechanisms to alleviate 
potential commons problems and property deadlocks is the delegation of 
a key part of the shareholders’ decision-making authority to the 
corporation’s board of directors and executive management. In the 
business corporation, while shareholders must ratify certain decisions 
such as mergers and charter amendments, they generally lack the power 
to initiate them. Moreover, in the U.S. legal system, which is considered 
relatively “board-centric” as compared with other jurisdictions, 
shareholders do not have the general power to overrule any matter that is 
within the board’s competence.82 To protect the corporation’s members 
as a class against potential agency problems, corporations maintain the 
 
 81. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE 
L.J. 387, 390, 393 (2000). Asset partitioning has two components. The first is designating a separate pool 
of assets that are associated with the firm and are distinct from the personal assets of the firm’s owners 
and managers. The second is assigning creditors with priorities in the distinct pools of assets that result 
from the formation of the legal entity. The assignment of such priorities can take two forms. One form is 
“affirmative” asset portioning, which assigns to the firm’s creditors a claim on the firm’s assets that is 
categorically prior to the claims of the personal creditors of the firm’s owners. The other form is 
“defensive” asset portioning, which does the opposite: “granting to the owners’ personal creditors a claim 
on the owners’ separate personal assets that is prior to the claim of the firm’s creditors.” Id. at 393-94. 
 82. John Armour et al., The Basic Governance Structure: The Interests of Shareholders as a Class, 
in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 49, 57-58, 72-
73, 75 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 3d ed. 2017). 
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right of members to elect and re-elect officers and managers, while 
imposing, to varying degrees, certain procedural and substantive duties—
such as fiduciary duties—on these agents at the service of 
members/shareholders.83  
3. Residual Governance by Majority.  
The third component of structuring the corporation to resolve potential 
collective action problems among its multiple members-turned-
shareholders is by establishing rules on majority vote in matters left for 
direct decision-making by members. While most decisions in the 
corporation are governed by a simple majority rule, including 
appointment rights of the board, a special majority is required for certain 
types of decisions, such as charter amendments, ratification of mergers, 
consolidations, and other fundamental organizational changes.84 
Moreover, many U.S. jurisdictions, Delaware being a key example, 
promote a “majority of the minority” approval as the most reliable 
guarantee for screening conflicted transactions with controlling 
shareholders.85  
While formal incorporation offers many advantages to promoting 
collective action, and to mitigate deadlocks over the use of assets, it would 
be impractical to assume that this institutional framework would be 
utilized to cover all types of multi-party asset governance. Legal transition 
costs, administrative costs, tax issues, and so forth comprise one set of 
factors that could pose a challenge for voluntary incorporation. More 
generally, parties might be deterred from entering into a legal framework 
that is at least partly irreversible, not only in the sense of transferring title 
to assets to a separate legal entity as a matter of law, but also of 
transferring decision-making powers to often-complex corporate organs. 
Accordingly, requiring parties to incorporate through a court-ordered 
mandate should be reserved, if at all, to exceptional cases in which 
 
 83. For such rules in the context of the business corporation, see Luca Enriques et al., The Basic 
Governance Structure: Minority Shareholders and Non-Shareholder Constituencies, in THE ANATOMY 
OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 79, 80-81 (Reinier Kraakman et al. 
eds., 3d ed. 2017).    
 84. Edward Rock et al., Fundamental Changes, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A 
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 171, 186 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 3d ed. 2017). 
 85. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and Some of the 
New Challenges We (and Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 678 n.3 (2005) (stating majority of 
minority voting is useful for litigation disputes); In re John Q. Hammons Hotels, Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 
758-CC, 2009 WL 3165613, at *12 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 2009) (providing that to sufficiently protect minority 
shareholders, special committees cannot waive the majority of the minority vote because “requiring 
approval of the majority of all the minority stockholders assures that a majority of the minority 
stockholders truly support the transaction, and that there is not actually ‘passive dissent’ of a majority of 
the minority stockholders”).        
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incorporation would be a lesser evil as compared with other types of top-
down coercion, as demonstrated in Part III-D in the context of involuntary 
land assembly.  
In some cases, trusts may offer a more practical and feasible approach. 
As Part IV shows, the common law trust acts somewhat like a corporation, 
in that it employs legal mechanisms to govern a distinct pool of assets, 
while dealing with competing or conflicting claims both among beneficial 
owners and vis-à-vis third parties. But the common law trust is also more 
flexible in many respects and can also be utilized on a temporary basis, 
through either voluntary trust deeds or judicial decrees, while avoiding 
cumbersome processes such as liquidation of a corporation. The trust can 
thus serve as an alternative for deadlocked property when an ex ante or ex 
post formal incorporation of assets owned or co-owned by multiple 
parties is unfeasible or inappropriate.   
C. Receivership 
Another mechanism that could be employed to rescue assets from 
deadlocks and other types of collective action problems is one of 
receivership. Generally, receivers are appointed by courts to handle 
distressed assets, including, but not limited to, assets burdened by debts 
and other obligations that cannot be met.86 Governed by state law in the 
United States, the appointment of a receiver is inherent in the equitable 
powers of the court. In some U.S. states it is also based on specific 
statutory authority. While receivers are generally appointed as ancillary 
relief, typically in a foreclosure case, courts may also appoint a receiver 
as a primary relief under rare and unusual circumstances when there is no 
other adequate remedy under law.87  
Alongside “passive” receivers who are tasked by the court with simply 
conserving the property at stake, the court can also appoint “active” 
receivers who can employ broader powers, such as the power to sell, to 
contract, and to settle and compromise claims with the court’s approval. 
“Commensurate with these broad powers, an active receiver is tasked with 
stringent reporting duties to the . . . court, the lender, and the debtor” (for 
assets burdened by an outstanding debt).88  
 
 86. See Brian S. Dervishi & Steven E. Seward, Using Receiverships to Maximize the Value of 
Distressed Assets, 83 FLA. BAR J. 8, ¶¶ 3-5 (2009) (explaining how receiverships are appointed and 
providing examples of the traits and powers of receiverships). 
 87. See, e.g., id., at ¶ 13-14 (explaining that “[appointing] of a receiver as a primary relief appears 
to require a showing of what necessitates the appointment of a receiver and what prevents the petitioning 
party from filing a complaint to foreclose the property.”); Stephen R. Miller, Distressed Condos: The 
Chicago Case, 45(2) REAL EST. REV. J. ART. 5 (2016) (providing that “appointment of a receiver is 
considered an extreme remedy in equity, when there is no adequate remedy under law”).  
 88. Dervishi & Seward, supra note 86, ¶ 21. 
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In some cases, receiverships are operated in the context of 
condominiums and other multi-owned properties. This is particularly so 
in the context of the equitable lien that CIDs, and condominiums in 
particular, have against unit owners who do not pay the CID’s 
assessments. Some state condominium acts also permit “the receiver to 
take possession of the condominium unit, if not occupied by the co-owner, 
and to lease the condominium unit and collect and apply” the rent to pay 
for assessments.89 In so doing, the receivership helps to preserve the 
common assets of the CID. Moreover, in some states, receivers can also 
be appointed to ensure that homeowners conform to certain regulatory 
obligations, such as making repairs or meeting city safety requirements.90 
In view of the broad equitable powers that courts have in the matter, in 
addition to or in lieu of specific statutory provisions, one could think 
about employing receivership more broadly as an instrument to overcome 
other types of collective action problems in multi-owned assets. Such an 
institutional change—especially if receivership is to play a primary role 
rather than serving as an ancillary remedy to foreclosure or insolvency—
requires legislatures or courts to develop a much thicker body of legal 
norms on receivership.  
This Article suggests, however, that employing receivership is 
unnecessary because there is already a different institutional setup that 
shares some of the basic traits of receivership, but is already well 
developed—trust law. Just like a receiver, a trustee serves as a fiduciary 
who is accountable not only to the trust’s beneficiaries but also to a court, 
and who can operate on a temporary or permanent basis, based on the 
underlying nature of the trust. It should thus be favored as an institutional 
mechanism for the governance of deadlocked assets.         
D. Eminent Domain  
As suggested in Part II-B, in the context of land assembly, the most 
dramatic and coercive mechanism currently in existence for handling 
property deadlocks is the power of eminent domain. To understand its 
role— and also its inherent disadvantages—one should briefly recall the 
state of events leading to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. 
City of New London,91 as well as the political and legal backlash that 
followed the use of eminent domain.  
In the year 2000, the then-distressed City of New London approved a 
 
 89. Patrick E. Mears and C. Kim Shierk, Workouts, Receiverships, and Foreclosures on Michigan 
Residential Condominium Projects: A Road Map for Mortgage Lenders, 36 MICH. REAL PROP. REV. 177, 
181 (2009). 
 90. Dervishi & Seward, supra note 86, ¶¶ 21, 31. 
 91. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
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redevelopment plan for the ninety-acre Fort Trumbull site. The City 
hoped that this redevelopment adjacent to and in conjunction with a new 
Pfizer research facility would help revitalize the local economy. The Fort 
Trumbull site, however, included 115 privately-owned properties, as well 
as thirty-two acres of publicly owned lands. The City tasked a nonprofit 
corporation, the New London Development Corporation (“NLDC”), with 
implementing the plan. NLDC was able to successfully negotiate the 
purchase of most private properties in the plan’s designated area. 
However, it failed to reach agreement with nine property owners, who 
altogether held fifteen properties. In response, the City and NLDC 
initiated the state law condemnation procedures. The use of eminent 
domain was validated by the U.S. Supreme Court, holding that “economic 
development” may amount to a valid “public use.”92  
The Kelo case instigated a stormy legal and public debate, leading 
legislatures in some U.S. states to limit the use of eminent domain for 
“economic development.”93 However, that increased protection 
implicates the potential problem of property deadlocks. With this in mind, 
scholars have tried to come up with potential “second-best mechanisms” 
for land assembly94—ones that fall short of full-fledged consent, but 
which also refrain from full-fledged coercion.   
Michael Heller and Rick Hills called to establish a Land Assembly 
District (“LAD”), which would have the power by a majority vote to 
approve or disapprove the sale of the district’s overall area to a developer 
or municipality seeking to consolidate the land into a single parcel, while 
also granting landowners a right to opt-out and receive fair market value 
compensation.95 Namely, instead of requiring consensus among all 
landowners, the conceptual assembly of landowners under a “district” 
would facilitate the move to a majority-based regime. In this sense, the 
move towards majority-based decisionmaking is different than that 
introduced in Part III-A. It results from a top-down notional consolidation 
of decision-making power.  
Amir Licht and this author suggested taking further the idea of 
consolidating landowners under a single institutional framework, from a 
notional assembly for the purpose of majority vote into a full-fledged 
incorporation. Under this model, although the taking component of 
eminent domain may need to remain an involuntary non-market 
 
 92. For a detailed analysis of the case and its aftermath, see generally AMNON LEHAVI, THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF PROPERTY: NORMS, INSTITUTIONS, CHALLENGES 214-219 (2013). 
 93. See id., at 215.  
 94. Zachary Grossman et al., Second-Best Mechanisms for Land Assembly and Hold-Out 
Problems, 175 J. PUB. ECON. 1 (2019). 
 95. Michael A. Heller & Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Land Assembly Districts, 121 HARV. L. 
REV. 1465, 1467-70 (2008). 
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transaction, a market-based mechanism for the compensation component 
is established in the form of a Special-Purpose Development Corporation 
(“SPDC”). The SPDC would acquire unified ownership of the land and 
the development project and would offer condemnees a choice between 
receiving pre-project fair market value compensation and pro rata shares 
in the SPDC. This proposal would make it more likely for compensation 
to be closely linked to the true economic value of the land and, 
consequently, that land assembly projects will be both more just and truly 
welfare-maximizing.96 This proposal seeks to harness the advantages of 
corporate governance and single ownership over the consolidated asset, 
as suggested in Part III-B, through a more moderate top-down fiat.  
While the above models should be taken into consideration as an 
alternative to eminent domain, Part IV of this Article will show how 
multi-beneficiary trusts can offer yet another alternative for resolving 
land assembly problems, as well as other types of collective action 
problems and potential deadlocks pertaining to multi-party ownership and 
governance of assets.  
IV. THE PROMISE OF MULTI-BENEFICIARY TRUSTS FOR INDIVISIBLE 
PROPERTY 
This Part introduces the key features of the trust, focusing on the 
proprietary and functional attributes of engaging in fiduciary 
administration of assets held under a trust. It illuminates the under-utilized 
potential of trust law in governing assets with multiple beneficiaries, such 
as through the duty of impartiality, and calls to expand the use of both 
voluntary trusts and ex lege trusts to foster collective action. It explains 
why transforming the legal interests of deadlocked parties into equitable 
proprietary interests under ex lege trusts should not be considered a 
taking. 
A. The Common Law Trust: Separation of Legal and Beneficial 
Ownership  
In Anglo-American systems, a “trust” is a mechanism where a person 
holds rights in an asset on behalf of another person (or in limited 
circumstances, for a certain purpose, such as in a private-purpose or a 
charitable trust).97 The essence of the trust lies in the separation of legal 
and equitable interests such that the person creating the trust—the 
settlor—conveys legal title in the property to the trustee for the benefit of 
 
 96. Amnon Lehavi & Amir N. Licht, Eminent Domain, Inc., 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1704 (2007).  
 97. MOHAMED RAMJOHN, UNLOCKING EQUITY AND TRUSTS 20 (7th ed., 2019). 
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the beneficiary, with the beneficiary enjoying an equitable interest in the 
property. The trustee is placed under fiduciary duties to control and 
manage the property for the sole purpose of promoting the beneficiary’s 
interests. All powers held by the trustee should be exercised in accordance 
with these fiduciary obligations, with the beneficiary having a legal 
standing to enforce them. While  the equitable interest of the beneficiary 
was traditionally treated as a right in personam, it is more appropriately 
viewed in current jurisprudence as a proprietary interest.98 This is so both 
in the sense that the beneficiaries may assign their rights to third parties—
such as a right to receive payments when the asset generates income99—
and also in that unauthorized transfers of the asset by the trustee to another 
person, who is not a bona fide purchaser, could be invalidated. Moreover, 
the beneficiaries can also trace their equitable interests by virtue of the 
trust through substitution of one kind of property rights to another—such 
as when an unauthorized sale is made to a bona fide purchaser and the 
beneficiary’s legal interest is transferred to the proceeds from the sale.100 
In addition to the trust’s internal governance matters, which address the 
powers and duties of the trustee and the corresponding rights of the 
beneficiary, trust law is also typified by “asset portioning” between the 
trust’s property and the trustee’s personal assets. The essence of asset 
portioning lies in its effect on third parties and, in particular, on creditors. 
Once the trust’s assets are separated from property owned or controlled 
by the trustee in a personal or another non-trust capacity, this means that 
the trustee’s creditors have no recourse against the trust property.101  
As discussed in Part III-B, asset portioning is a defining feature of 
organizational law, and corporate law in particular. It is vividly illustrated 
by the separate legal entity of the corporation. This means that the 
corporation directly owns assets and, correspondingly, that the 
corporation’s creditors’ claims on the corporation’s assets categorically 
have priority to the claims of the personal creditors of the corporation’s 
shareholders.102 In the case of a common law trust, such a straightforward 
asset portioning is not possible because the trust is not a freestanding legal 
entity.103 Under traditional trust law, the trustee was personally liable for 
obligations arising from ownership of the trust property, while being 
entitled to indemnification out of the trust property. However, current 
trust law enables a creditor of the trustee acting in the fiduciary capacity 
 
 98. Id. at 27.  
 99. JAMES E. PENNER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS 27-28 (Nicola Padfield ed., 9th ed., 2014). 
 100. Id. at 312.  
 101. Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust Law as Fiduciary Governance Plus Asset Portioning, in THE WORLDS 
OF THE TRUST 428, 436 (Lionel Smith ed., 2013) (hereinafter: Sitkoff, Asset Portioning).  
 102. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 81, at 393-94.  
 103. Sitkoff, Asset Portioning, supra note 101, at 435.  
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to recover directly from the trust fund without recourse against the 
trustee’s personally-owned property, and vice versa in regard to 
obligations of the trustee in a personal or other capacity. Accordingly, 
from the perspective of third parties, modern trust law effectively splits 
the trustee into two distinct legal persons, and, correspondingly, splits the 
two different pools of assets.       
B. FIDUCIARY ADMINISTRATION OF THE TRUST’S ASSETS 
Trust law identifies a set of fiduciary obligations, which the trustee has 
toward the trust’s beneficiaries. One such prominent duty includes the 
duty of loyalty, by which the trustee must “administer the trust solely in 
the interest of the beneficiaries.”104 The trustee is, therefore, not entitled 
to act to promote her own interest, or even act with a mixed motive. This 
means that the trustee cannot engage in self-dealing or make personal 
profits from the trust. To the extent that such self-dealing or other 
conflicts of interests are shown, it will be enforced by a “no further 
inquiry” rule.105 Even in cases where the testator explicitly authorizes the 
trustee to be positioned in a conflict of interest, the trustee will be held 
accountable in the form of “especially careful scrutiny.” The trustee’s 
actions may be scrutinized even when the beneficiary gives consent for a 
conflict of interest after full disclosure by the trustee.106 The duty of 
loyalty is inherent to the trust, granting clear superiority to the proprietary 
interests of the beneficiary.   
The other major fiduciary duty of the trustee is the duty of care, also 
known as the duty of prudence, with such prudence applying to all 
functions of the trusteeship; namely, distribution (i.e., making 
disbursements of income or principal to the beneficiaries), investment, 
custody  (i.e., collecting and protecting the trust property), and 
administration of the trust.107 In England, Section 1 of the Trustee Act 
2000 (“Trustee Act”) reformulates the duty of care, as it was developed 
in case law, by replacing the common law duty of care with a limited 
number of statutory duties identified in the Trustee Act. For the types of 
duties not enumerated in the Trustee Act, common law duties will 
continue to apply. Additionally, the duty of care does not apply under the 
Trustee Act if it appears from the trust instrument that the duty is not 
meant to apply, such that a settlor may expressly restrict the duty’s 
 
 104. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS, § 78(1) (2007). 
 105. RAMJOHN, supra note 97, at 507-10.  
 106. Robert H. Sitkoff, Fiduciary Principles in Trust Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
FIDUCIARY LAW 41, 44-46 (Evan J. Criddle et al., eds., 2019) (hereinafter: Sitkoff, Principles). 
 107. Id. at 46-51.  
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application.108  
The fiduciary obligations of the trustee include other duties, with slight 
variations between English and American law, such as the duty to inform 
and account,109 the duty of the trustee to act personally—while allowing 
the trustee to delegate certain functions to others110—and the duty to act 
impartially in case of multiple beneficiaries, which is discussed in detail 
in the following Section of this Article.  
More generally, because the voluntary trust—be it an inter vivos or a 
testamentary trust—should reflect and implement the particular wishes of 
the testator, the fiduciary duties may include additional duties or 
particular manifestations of the general fiduciary duties developed by law. 
The scope of these duties is also impacted by the ability of the testator 
to exclude certain fiduciary duties, or by that of the beneficiary to release 
the trustee from liability for conduct that is otherwise considered a breach 
of duty. This touches on the core issue of whether fiduciary duties 
developed under statutory or case law are mandatory or, rather, default 
rules that can be contracted away. Generally speaking, while exclusion 
clauses in trusts are not considered prima facie invalid on public policy 
grounds, such exclusion clauses need to be explicit and detailed.111  
Moreover, such exclusion clauses cannot exempt a trustee from the 
essential duties imposed on trustees—the mandatory core of trust 
relations. These core requirements typically include the duty to act in 
good faith, in honesty, and for the benefit of the beneficiaries, as 
explained in the seminal English case of Armitage v. Nurse.112 In other 
words, while an exculpation clause can exclude liability for negligence, it 
cannot exempt a trustee for an act or omission done in bad faith, reckless 
indifference, or through intentional or willful neglect.113  
The core of mandatory duties imposed on a trustee was further 
explained by the Delaware Supreme Court in the matter of McNeil v. 
McNeil: “[a] trust in which there is no legally binding obligation on a 
trustee is a trust in name only and more in the nature of an absolute estate 
or fee simple grant of property.”114 From a property law perspective, this 
means that the equitable interest of the beneficiary in a trust is inherently 
and categorically superior to the trustee’s legal title, such that the legal 
title is instated for the sole purpose of serving the equitable interest. 
 
 108. RAMJOHN, supra note 97, at 484-90.  
 109. Sitkoff, Principles, supra note 106, at 53-54. 
 110. RAMJOHN, supra note 97, at 494-96. 
 111. Id. at 497-500. 
 112. Armitrage v. Nurse [1997] EWCA (Civ) 1279. 
 113. Sitkoff, Principles, supra note 106, at 55-57. 
 114. 798 A.2d 503, 509 (Del. 2002). 
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C. The Duty of Impartiality and Intergenerational Trusts 
The duty of impartiality was developed in trust law to cover situations 
in which the trust has two or more beneficiaries or purposes—whether 
such purposes are private, charitable, or mixed. It applies whether the 
beneficiaries’ interests or purposes are successive or concurrent.115 
This doctrine is featured most prominently in the context of an 
intergenerational or otherwise successive trust, such as when one person 
is designated as a life beneficiary (e.g., a surviving spouse) and another 
person (e.g., the testator’s and/or the beneficiary’s child), known as the 
remainder beneficiary, receives a future interest to be materialized upon 
the death of the life beneficiary. Such trusts are often crafted such that the 
life beneficiary is entitled to “income” from the trust’s assets, while the 
remainder beneficiary is entitled to the trust’s “principal” or “capital.” In 
such a case, the classification of a certain return as either income or capital 
decides which of the beneficiaries will be entitled to it. More 
fundamentally, such a split between current and future beneficiaries of the 
trust leads to potential conflicts or preferences with regard to the types of 
investment and management choices that the trustee has to make, such as 
whether to look for short- or long-term gains, or to replace assets not 
prone to appreciation. In the case of multiple present beneficiaries, the 
parties may diverge in their needs, tax positions, level of risk tolerance, 
etc. A similar set of differences may also apply to multiple future 
beneficiaries.116     
In multi-beneficiary trusts, the trustee is required to give due regard to 
the interests of the diverse beneficial interests created by the terms of the 
trust and to act impartially in regard to investing, protecting, and 
distributing the estate, and in performing all administrative functions. In 
consulting and communicating with beneficiaries, the trustee is further 
required to proceed in a manner that fairly reflects the diversity of their 
concerns and beneficial interests. The duty of impartiality further forbids 
the trustee from being influenced by personal favoritism or animosity 
toward individual beneficiaries, or from ignoring their interests due to 
oversight or neglect.117 
Impartiality should not be equated, however, with equality. Rather, the 
balancing of the competing interests should reasonably reflect any 
preferences and priorities among the beneficiaries that are discernible 
from the terms and purposes of the trust or from the nature of the 
beneficial interests. Accordingly, to the extent that such preferences and 
priorities are not clear from the trust, the trustee must exercise discretion 
 
 115. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS, Reporter’s Notes on § 79, cmts. a, b (2007).  
 116. Id. at General Comments.  
 117. Id. at Reporter’s Notes on § 79 cmt. b.  
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in interpreting and inferring from the terms. More broadly, the trustee 
should adhere to the rules on impartiality laid down by statute or case 
law.118  
While the general nature of the duty of impartiality has not been 
explained well in statutory or case law, a meaningful development has 
occurred in the context of the intergenerational trust, especially in regard 
to the apportionment of revenues between income and capital 
beneficiaries and to the implications for the investment and management 
choices that the trustee should make whenever the settlor does not give 
clear instructions in the terms of the trust about such matters.  
In England, prior to the Trusts (Capital and Income) Act 2013, the 
equitable rules of apportionment were governed by a complex set of 
norms created mostly by nineteenth-century case law. These norms dealt 
with various issues, such as an implicit trust for sale in the case of certain 
residuary personal estates, compensation for the capital beneficiary for 
loss pending the conversion of such assets, formulas for apportionment 
for proceeds from non-income producing assets such as life policies, and 
apportionment of debts payable out of the residuary estate.119  
As noted by the Law Commission in its 2009 report, such rules are 
obsolete for addressing contemporary circumstances, and are also 
“unclear in places and involve cumbersome calculations often relating to 
disproportionately small sums of money.”120 Following the Law 
Commission’s recommendations, Parliament enacted the Trusts (Capital 
and Income) Act 2013, by which such rules will not apply to new trusts. 
The Act thus grants more flexibility to trustees in determining the 
apportionment rules. Otherwise, the norms concerning sale and 
reinvestment of trust property are now part of the trustee’s general duties 
under the Trustee Act 2000.121  
Along somewhat similar lines, U.S. law has also moved toward a more 
flexible approach for investing and managing assets for multi-beneficiary 
trusts, rather than engaging in the formal characterization of a certain 
return as either income or principal. One such reform grants the trustee 
the power to adjust between income and principal as necessary to comply 
with the general duty of impartiality. Another reform is the creation of the 
unitrust, by which the trustee is required to pay a certain percentage 
(usually between three to five percent) of the value of the trust corpus to 
 
 118. Id. at Reporter’s Notes on § 79, cmts. a, b. 
 119. RAMJOHN, supra note 97, at 491-92. 
 120. THE LAW COMMISSION, CAPITAL AND INCOME IN TRUSTS: CLASSIFICATION AND 
APPORTIONMENT, HC 426, at ¶ 6.55 (2009), available at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/24833
1/0426.pdf.  
 121. Trusts (Capital and Income) Act 2013 § 1. See also RAMJOHN, supra note 97, at 493. 
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the income beneficiary annually, but is otherwise free to focus on 
appropriate and prudent investment decisions, without regard for the 
formal classification of a specific return.122 
The move toward allowing more discretion to trustees in making 
investment decisions, while focusing on substance over form, will foster 
the development of legal principles on the duty of impartiality. This 
means that the use of multi-beneficiary trusts can be expanded to many 
other situations, including various forms of contemporaneous multi-
beneficiary trusts. This set of norms can be accordingly applied not only 
to the conventional gratuitous trust, but also to commercial-trust 
arrangements and, moreover, to the crafting of trusts as an ex lege 
mechanism.  
D. Expanding the Scope of Contemporaneous Multi-Beneficiary Trusts 
To appreciate the broader potential of the multi-beneficiary trust in 
addressing various settings of asset governance in the context of 
divergence or outright conflicts among co-beneficiaries, it is helpful to 
consider the law and practice of various commercial-trust arrangements. 
A prominent example is the trust indenture: an agreement between the 
issuer of a bond—or another type of security interest—and a trustee who 
represents the interests of the group of security holders.123  
While the indenture principally deals with the scope of the trustee’s 
right to act vis-à-vis the bond issuer, especially when a default in paying 
out the debt takes place, the existence of multiple security holders may 
lead to internal differences of opinion among the security holders. This is 
chiefly the case when the various security holders are formally divided 
into groups with different kinds of entitlements under the security interest. 
One such instance is when the security holders are divided into interest-
only and principal-only classes. This division could have implications 
when the bond issuer wishes to restructure the debt to avoid default. If the 
trustee agrees to reduce the interest rate, the restructuring would come at 
the expense of the interest-only class. Alternatively, reducing the 
principal of the loan adversely affects the principal-only class.124  
Even more common are situations in which classes of security holders 
have different ranks or priorities in regard to the underlying assets 
securing the debt such that, upon foreclosure or other realization of assets, 
senior creditors get the first cut at the distribution of the proceeds, whereas 
junior or subordinated creditors are only entitled to share in any remaining 
 
 122. Sitkoff, Principles, supra note 106, at 55-57. 
 123. Trust Indenture, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).  
 124. Steven L. Schwarcz, Fiduciaries with Conflicting Obligations, 94 MINN. L. REV.1867, 1870-
71 (2010). 
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sums. In deciding how to act in such cases, the indenture trustee should 
consider whether foreclosure and realization of assets would be a better 
option than restructuring the debt. Such a choice has implications for both 
allocative efficiency, considering the security holders as a single group, 
and for the distribution of proceeds among the various ranks of security 
holders. For example, senior creditors may push for a quick foreclosure 
realization of the assets to the extent that this would satisfy their prior 
claims. Alternatively, junior creditors might seek to allow for 
restructuring, which would lower the amounts due by the issuer or 
postpone the dates of payment, but would otherwise maintain the pro rata 
share of the junior security holders in the restructured debt.   
 Statutory and case law have offered relatively little guidance as to the 
principles that should instruct the indenture trustee in fulfilling potentially 
conflicting obligations among such classes. For example, in Bank of New 
York v. Montana Board of Investors,125 the English High Court of Justice 
dealt with a scenario where the senior creditors wanted the collateral 
trustee to foreclose on the financial assets of the debtor, which at the post-
2008 financial collapse market prices would have yielded barely enough 
money to repay the senior investors, but would have left nothing for the 
subordinated investors. The latter group wanted the trustee to delay 
foreclosure, hoping to be repaid from a subsequent rise in prices of the 
financial assets or from collections on them.126 The court held that the 
senior creditors had no explicit contractual right to direct the trustee to 
foreclose on the assets. Applying New York law, the court stated that the 
“collateral is held for the benefit of all the secured parties,” and that the 
trustee is not merely an “agent of the creditors, but is required to exercise 
discretion.” The court, however, did not provide the trustee with specific 
guidelines or normative principles as to how discretion should be 
exercised in the matter.127    
Steven Schwarcz offered a detailed analysis of the challenges faced by 
trustees with conflicting obligations in commercial-trust arrangements, 
identifying the similarities and differences between such settings and 
those of the gratuitous trust.128 Per Schwarcz, the two situations may 
diverge in that beneficiaries of gratuitous trusts typically settle for 
preserving the value of the trust assets, while commercial investors look 
to maximize value and take risks in doing so. At the same time, trustees 
in both scenarios are tasked with governing a consolidated pool of assets 
to serve beneficiaries as a group, while at the same time considering intra-
group differential effects.  
 
 125. Bank of N.Y. v. Mont. Bd. of Invs., [2008] EWHC (Ch) 1594. 
 126. See Schwarcz, supra note 124, at 1872-73. 
 127. Bank of N.Y. v. Mont. Bd. of Invs., [2008] EWHC (Ch) 1594, ¶¶ 58-59. 
 128. Schwarcz, supra note 124, at 1872-73. 
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This means that in both commercial and gratuitous settings, trustees 
should seek to promote overall efficiency by preserving or maximizing 
value (as the case may be), while refraining from taking action that may 
benefit one class of investors—even if such class enjoys priority based on 
the terms of the trust or the covenant—if it would result in an aggregate 
deadweight loss. The duty of impartiality, and its equivalents in the 
commercial context, should therefore seek to serve the interests of all 
diverse interest groups, without necessarily treating all sub-groups 
equally. There is little economic or legal sense in creating classes of 
investors that are defined as “senior” and others as “junior” or 
“subordinate,” if the two classes of investors are treated exactly the same 
way in allocating proceeds. However, simply disregarding the interests of 
the junior or subordinate beneficiaries does not conform to the very idea 
of a trust, be it commercial or gratuitous.  
Moreover, in reality, not all actions taken by a trustee can be pareto 
optimal, meaning that all sub-groups or classes would objectively benefit 
from a certain action taken in regard to the trust’s assets. The extent to 
which a trustee would still be considered as meeting the duty of 
impartiality, even if some beneficiaries are disadvantaged by a particular 
action, would be measured by the trustee’s ability to ensure genuine 
overall efficiency, to consider other options that could achieve the same 
or a close overall result, mitigate the disadvantage caused to some 
beneficiaries, and to adequately and transparently inform all beneficiaries 
of actions taken.  
As the next Sections show, the trustee’s discretion while acting in the 
face of potential conflicts among beneficiaries would be influenced by 
whether the trust is the result of a voluntary trust or a statutory (ex lege) 
one. The terms of a gratuitous or a commercial trust guide the trustee in 
identifying the purposes for which the trust’s assets should be used and 
the types of benefits it should grant to different kind of beneficiaries, 
while keeping a core commitment to impartiality, as developed by legal 
doctrine. Alternatively, a systematic use of ex lege trusts would require a 
thicker array of statutory or case law that would guide trustees in a variety 
of situations involving the governance of indivisible assets in the face of 
conflicts among beneficiaries. Such norms could be developed in the 
context of specific resources (land, chattels, or intellectual property) that 
face the problem of asset-indivisibility alongside conflicts among 
beneficiaries.  
The general idea here is that the duty of impartiality would be further 
developed by statutory or case law so as to allow trustees in charge of ex 
lege trusts to exercise discretion and to operate continuously and 
effectively, without constantly having to approach courts for ad hoc 
directions. If the court were required to constantly be involved in 
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decision-making, the way it normally does in bankruptcy or receivership 
cases, then the model of a multi-beneficiary trust would not have a real 
advantage over the alternatives set out in Part III.     
E. Incentivizing Voluntary Testamentary / Inter Vivos Trusts 
The chief way in which trusts could be utilized to effectively govern 
indivisible assets in the face of potential conflicts among beneficiaries is 
the voluntary express trust, be it inter vivos or testamentary. Typically, 
this would mean that the original single owner of the asset, such as an 
artist who owns not only copyright to her works, but also the indivisible 
right of publicity in authorizing the use of his or her name or image for 
commercial purposes, would create an express trust.  
The trust should address first and foremost the governance of the asset 
in a unified manner over the long term so as to increase the overall value 
of the estate while trying to foresee potential conflicts among the 
beneficiaries and giving instructions to the trustee on how to decide such 
disputes. The term “value” could and should refer not only to monetary 
value, but also to the broader goals that the estate should promote. Some 
testators may prefer to be highly selective in selling individual items out 
of the estate or in granting permission to commercialize the trust’s estate 
as a whole. Other testators may be driven by other preferences. But to the 
extent that the testator wishes to preserve the entirety of the estate while 
also seeking to grant the stream of benefits flowing from the trust’s estate 
to multiple persons or purposes, the testator should try to identify the 
types of decisions that may be particularly prone to causing strife among 
the estate’s multiple beneficiaries and that could bring about property 
deadlock, absent the creation of a trust. 
Not all conflicts can be anticipated in advance, even by the most 
prudent testator. But the testator should provide the trustee with as many 
general principles as possible to handle future contingencies—many of 
which the testator has no way of knowing of at the time of the creation of 
the trust. If this is the case, the legal institution of the trust could be 
brought to its fullest potential based on a combination of the express terms 
of the trust alongside the general rules developed by statutory and case 
law, including the duty of impartiality. The strength of trust law lies in its 
ability to engage in the continuous governance of assets, with the trustee 
being able to make daily decisions without constantly having to approach 
courts for guidance, but while still enjoying access to the courts when the 
need for guidance truly arises. 
Furthermore, in the case of potentially deadlocked properties (in the 
sense that they are not effectively indivisible but are designated to benefit 
multiple beneficiaries), the advantage of creating trusts to govern such 
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assets lies not only with the beneficiaries as a group, but also with society 
in general. The types of assets and scenarios described in Part II as 
prominent examples of deadlocked property are ones that the public at 
large might stand to lose from such a standoff, whether it happens in the 
context of land, biomedicine, or culture. This also means that, as a matter 
of public policy, the creation of trusts in such instances might be 
encouraged by various mechanisms such as tax incentives or other 
regulatory measures. Such steps could be especially appealing in the case 
of a testamentary trust, in view of the fact that a posthumous transfer of 
assets to heirs through a will would be subject to inheritance tax. At the 
same time, any regulatory benefits should be carefully weighed against 
other considerations—including societal wealth distribution in the case of 
taxation.129  
F. Devising a Multi-Beneficiary Trust as Ex Lege Intervention 
Statutory trusts are relatively limited in scope in both the Anglo-
American legal system and around the world. One such prominent setting 
concerns the trust created ex lege when a person dies intestate such that, 
under statutory law, an administrator is appointed by the court to 
distribute the estate’s assets among the rightful heirs under the laws of 
inheritance.130 Another key setting in which statutory law provides for the 
appointment of a trustee by the court is that of insolvency or bankruptcy, 
such as under the English Insolvency Act 1986,131 or the U.S. Bankruptcy 
Code,132 where an officer is appointed by the court to act as a trustee either 
for liquidating the debtor’s assets or for devising a reorganization plan.133 
Courts also appoint trustees based on statutory provisions when the owner 
of an asset, or its designated beneficiary, is unable to act independently as 
a matter of legal capacity, as in the case of minors or those unable to act 
due to a physical or mental illness. 
Trusts are also governed by a statutory mandate in other contexts, such 
as in the case of sums received by financial intermediaries, lawyers, and 
insurance or estate agents.134 These various statutory trusts diverge in the 
identity of actors involved, kinds of assets implicated, and interpersonal 
 
 129. For the long-lasting debate about this tax, see Inheritance Tax: A Hated Tax but a Fair One, 
THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 23, 2017), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/11/23/a-hated-tax-but-a-
fair-one. 
 130. See Administration of Estates Act 1925 (as amended), 15 & 16 Geo. 5 c. 23, Part III, §§ 32-
44. 
 131. Insolvency Act 1986, c. 45, Part IV, Ch. 4, § 101(3)(b).  
 132. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 (2020).  
 133. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a).   
 134. See, generally MAURIZIO LUPOI, TRUSTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY  19-20 (Simon Dix trans., 
Cambridge U. Press 2000) (1997).  
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circumstances leading to the appointment of a trustee by a court, based on 
the statutory mandate to do so. All cases, however, are typified by the 
need for external governance of an asset and, consequently, for separating 
control from entitlement to the stream of benefits when the rightful 
owners or beneficiaries are normatively or practically prevented from 
acting.  
Moreover, the two most frequent settings of statutory trusts—intestacy 
and insolvency—are essentially typified by a collective action problem 
and, accordingly, by the need of statutory law and judicial intervention to 
appoint a trustee to engage in such collective action for the benefit of the 
entire group of beneficiaries, while considering potential differences 
within group members.  
In the case of intestacy, multiple rightful heirs may face difficult 
problems in coordinating the allocation of property, even if the assets in 
the estate are otherwise divisible so that they could be distributed in kind 
among the heirs or sold off to others while dividing the proceeds. 
Consider again the case of Prince. The divisions among his heirs even for 
those types of assets that could be separated from the entire estate and 
distributed or sold may result from disagreements as to which heir would 
receive which assets, which items should be auctioned or otherwise sold 
to a third party, and how to calculate the value of each asset. The 
appointment of a trustee is required to hold an orderly process that will 
benefit the group as a whole by maximizing the value of the estate while 
giving each heir his or her own share.   
This is also the case with insolvency proceedings. “[T]he collective 
nature of insolvency proceedings, orchestrated by courts and appointed 
officers (such as receivers or trustees in bankruptcy), is intended to 
optimize the process of mapping the different claims [and proprietary 
interests], identifying the debtor’s assets, and distributing proceeds in an 
efficient manner.”135 As Douglas Baird and Thomas Jackson note: “A 
collective insolvency proceeding is directed toward reducing the costs 
associated with diverse ownership interests and encouraging those with 
interests in the firm’s assets to put those assets to the use the group as a 
whole would favor.”136  
In the case of diverse proprietary interests—such as creditors having a 
specific security interest over an asset, creditors entitled to a floating lien, 
employees, suppliers, tax authorities, shareholders, and so forth—absent 
a collective proceeding, each individual stakeholder or sub-group of 
 
 135. AMNON LEHAVI, PROPERTY LAW IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 257 (2019) (hereinafter: 
LEHAVI, GLOBALIZING).  
 136. Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of 
Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy , 
51 U. CHI. L. REV. 97, 103 (1984).  
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creditors would act to promote their own interests in a way that might 
damage the group as a whole—potentially even through a fire sale of 
assets well below their market rate. This may not necessarily benefit each 
individual stakeholder or sub-group of creditors. Granting control over 
the process to a court-appointed bankruptcy trustee requires the holders 
of diverse proprietary interests “to act collectively rather than to take 
individual actions that are not interests of the investors as a group.”137  
The collective insolvency/bankruptcy proceedings conducted by the 
trustee do not abolish the diversity of proprietary interests. For purposes 
of distribution of assets or proceeds, each class of stakeholders is ranked 
based on the particular set of proprietary priorities established by the 
insolvency/bankruptcy law in the relevant national legal system.138 
Generally speaking, secured creditors are granted priority over non-
secured creditors. As is the case with the general duty of impartiality in 
trust law, impartiality does not mandate equality across different sub-
groups or classes that are ranked differently by law for purposes of 
priority. But the collective process, mandated as a matter of law and 
administered by a trustee, is intended to promote overall efficiency while 
considering the diverse property interests of all stakeholders.    
The key features typifying ex lege trusts in the case of intestacy or 
insolvency could be embraced, mutatis mutandis, when dealing with the 
types of situations that are the focus of this Article. This means that 
statutory law should expand the use of ex lege trusts and could 
accordingly grant courts the discretion to appoint a trustee for the 
governance of assets that are typified by indivisibility and diverse 
proprietary interests that may bring about—or already have resulted in—
property deadlocks. As a discretionary remedy, the appointment of a 
trustee in appropriate cases should be done following a motion submitted 
by one of the interested parties, and after the other stakeholders in the 
underlying assets have had the chance to respond to the request. The court 
should consider whether other options would not be applicable and/or 
preferable over ex lege trusteeship, and the extent to which the trust 
should be established for a fixed period of time, or for the purpose of 
taking a specific course of action. Alternatively, the court should consider 
whether it should grant trustees broad discretion that is unlimited in time 
at the point of establishment, but nevertheless subject to judicial 
supervision, or one that could be terminated at the consent of all 
beneficiaries.  
 
 137. Id. at 106. 
 138. For the differences among national legal systems in ranking priorities to different classes of 
stakeholders, based on normative and other considerations, see LEHAVI, GLOBALIZING, supra note 135, 
at 235-37 (providing examples of the differences among national legal systems in ranking priorities to 
different classes of stakeholders, based on normative and other considerations).  
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Therefore, as a matter of legal design, such an ex lege trust could 
borrow elements from both fixed trusts and discretionary trusts, as they 
are known in the case of voluntary gratuitous trusts.139 Similar to the fixed 
trust, the ex lege trust, as designed by the court in a specific case, should 
determine in advance the pro rata share and type of interest of each 
beneficiary in the trust’s assets as a whole, with such a determination 
generally reflecting the pre-trust state of events. At the same time, the 
court should typically grant trustees broad discretion over determining the 
types of actions that should be taken regarding the trust’s assets, with such 
discretion going beyond the administrative discretion that is embedded in 
every kind of a fixed trust.  
For example, in the case of an ex lege trust established in a particular 
case to remedy a deadlock among multiple heirs of an artist, with the 
purpose of governing the repertoire and merchandizing rights of the 
artist’s estate, the court should not guide the trustee in advance as to if 
and how to grant certain licenses or permissions. This also means that the 
court should not commit the trustees in advance to distribute each year a 
certain share of the property (either income or capital) to the beneficiaries. 
The broad discretion of the trustee should lie exactly in deciding how to 
govern and manage the asset given the deadlock that has occurred among 
the co-owners. In so doing, as discussed in Part IV-D above, the trustee 
should seek to promote the long-term value of the estate while making 
value judgments on whether a certain license or permission would serve 
the estate over the long term, considering not only short-term profits but 
also normative considerations of reputation and legacy, as demonstrated 
in the Introduction with the case of Prince. In doing so, the trustee should 
consider the different interests of the beneficiaries, balancing between 
promoting the good of the group without placing an overly-heavy burden 
on the interests of certain beneficiaries, such as beneficiaries that are in 
greater need for short-term income than others. In this sense, the ex lege 
trust should resemble the non-exhaustive discretionary trust, by which the 
settlor of such a gratuitous trust gives the trustee discretion as to whether 
or not to distribute the property in the form of income or capital, provided 
that any such distribution follows the fixed feature of the trust: its pro rata 
allocation.  
One more feature that should be borrowed from the gratuitous 
discretionary trusts is that of group interest, by which, if all objects 
entitled to both income and capital act in agreement, they are entitled to 
terminate the discretionary trust and acquire the property for their own 
benefit.140 What this means in the context of the suggested ex lege trust is 
 
 139. For the features of discretionary trusts versus fixed trusts, see RAMJOHN, supra note 97, at 145-
46. 
 140. Id. at 146.   
39
Lehavi: The Law of Trusts and Collective Action
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2021
2021] THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION 427 
that if the formerly deadlocked parties come to their senses after the court 
intervenes in the matter and orders the establishment of the trust, the 
beneficiaries should be able to terminate the trust by consent and reclaim 
their pro rata ownership rights instead of their pro rata beneficiary rights. 
Such a consensual move should be supported by the underlying statutory 
provisions creating the framework for the ex lege trust, including tax rules 
that apply to such a re-transfer of the trust’s assets to the co-owners. 
G. Is a Statutory or Judicially-created Trust a Taking? 
A legislative reform that authorizes a court to order the setting up of a 
multi-beneficiary trust to resolve a property deadlock could be considered 
as a prima facie violation of property rights. This is so because the right 
of ownership or entitlement held by each of the parties would be 
transformed into one of a beneficiary under a trust, and also because 
control over decision-making would be taken from the co-owners and 
transferred to a court-appointed trustee.  
Therefore, the enactment of such a statutory tool and the decision of a 
court in a particular case to use its authority and establish an ex lege trust 
could be subject to a constitutional challenge. In certain countries, this 
could invoke scrutiny under property clauses in supranational 
conventions, such as under Article 1 of the First Protocol of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.141 
Part III-D discussed the use of eminent domain as a compulsory 
mechanism to resolve anticommons scenarios implicating land assembly 
for the purpose of redevelopment and the validation of the purpose of 
“economic development” as a valid “public use” by the U.S. Supreme 
Court. It also presented scholarly suggestions for alternative mechanisms 
that could employ a somewhat lesser degree of coercion to allow for this 
type of collective action to move forward. 
That said, the taking of property and its transfer to the government or 
another external body, such that the former owners are compulsorily 
“bought out” of their proprietary interests, still represents the most 
intrusive form of intervention to resolve potential property deadlocks. The 
other options outlined in Part III present a lesser degree of intervention; 
but in many cases, these would be impractical or ineffective to resolve 
property deadlocks for indivisible property. Given the built-in constraints 
of these alternatives, the multi-beneficiary trust offers an effective mode 
of action that builds on the law and practice of the centuries-old institution 
of the common law trust, without fully denying the proprietary rights of 
 
 141. Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
Art. 1, Mar. 20, 1952, No. 2889, 213 U.N.T.S. 262. 
40
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 89, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol89/iss2/4
428 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89 
the co-owners in the underlying assets.  
Accordingly, this Article suggests that neither the enactment of a new 
type of statutory trust nor a court decision to employ its authority in a 
particular case to establish such a trust should be considered as a taking 
of property. Rather, this statutory trust should be viewed as a regulatory 
measure that intervenes in the control and use of the underlying assets, 
but should be considered prima facie constitutionally valid and as meeting 
the “proportionality” standard according to property protection legal 
instruments, such as the European Convention on Human Rights. 
The key argument why the ex lege trust is not a taking or an otherwise 
impermissible intervention with private property lies in the fact that its 
exercise by judicial decree in appropriate cases is not intended to promote 
an external public purpose—one that would be enjoyed mostly by other 
persons or the public at large. This tool is aimed at serving the economic 
interests of the group of former co-owners now turned into co-
beneficiaries of the trust. In simple terms, the employment of the ex lege 
trust is a last resort to save co-owners from themselves.  
It is true that, under a joint trusteeship, one or more of the co-
beneficiaries may object to certain actions taken by the trustee, leading 
such a party to argue that a property deadlock is actually better than 
governance by the trustee. Such a party may also argue that the loss of 
control, even if joint control, over the governance of the underlying assets 
establishes an injury in itself—one that has non-instrumental 
implications, such as a loss of autonomy. That said, the placing of control 
in the hands of a trustee—one that owes fiduciary duties to the 
beneficiaries, including the duty of impartiality—resembles at least to 
some extent other forms of regulation or top-down subjection of 
individual discretion that is intended to benefit all parties in the long run.  
One example is zoning laws, under which the liberty of each landowner 
to use their land as they deem fit is constrained by external rules that also 
protect the landowner from unmonitored, adverse land uses by other 
landowners. Even if zoning laws are not always implemented in a 
perfectly reciprocal manner, in the sense that some landowners may enjoy 
a more favorable or profitable regulation than others, the system of zoning 
laws in its entirety lies in top-down governance that promotes overall 
efficacy in the absence of consent.142 As such, zoning and other statutory 
or regulatory mechanisms intended to regulate the governance of uses, 
while allowing the relevant private parties to enjoy the stream of benefits 
resulting from such regulated uses, are not considered prima facie as 
constitutionally invalid.143  
 
 142. See, generally Amnon Lehavi, Zoning and Market Externalities, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 361, 
370-73 (2017).  
 143. In the particular case of zoning, the general constitutional legitimacy of such statutory or 
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This is not to say that, in certain extreme cases, a generally valid 
regulatory mechanism might not amount to a “regulatory taking” as 
applied and would, therefore, be considered as an illegitimate exercise of 
the power. This is the case with zoning or other regulatory measures.144 
This doctrine could also apply, mutatis mutandis, to a decision to establish 
an ex lege trust when it can be clearly demonstrated at the outset, even 
before the trustee starts to act, that the trust is either not the most effective 
solution to resolve the property deadlock or that it will clearly sacrifice 
the legitimate interests of one (or more) co-owner turned into a co-
beneficiary for the benefit of other co-beneficiaries in an unbalanced and 
disproportionate manner. Courts should refrain from ordering the 
establishment of a trust in such cases.145 However, absent such 
extraordinary circumstances, the statutory mechanism authorizing these 
trusts and its judicial application should be considered as constitutionally 
legitimate and meeting the proportionality standard.     
The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights on Article 
1 of the First Protocol of the European Convention on Human Rights—
as well as principles introduced by other supranational courts and 
tribunals in interpreting property protection clauses146—may further 
assist, by way of analogy, in identifying the criteria under which the 
setting up of such a multi-beneficiary trust would be considered a valid 
exercise of a general statutory authority to do so.  
Beyond the principles of lawfulness—by which the underlying 
applicable provisions are “sufficiently accessible, precise and foreseeable 
in their application” —and the requirement that such interference serves 
a “legitimate aim in the general interest,” the validity of an underlying 
statute and its application in particular cases lie in the concept of 
proportionality or fair balance. As articulated by the court in the leading 
case of Hutten-Czapska v. Poland, “there must also be a reasonable 
relation of proportionality between the means employed and the aim 
sought to be realized by any measures applied by the State, including 
measures designed to control the use of the individual’s property.”147  
It is of particular importance for the potential application of the 
 
regulatory mechanisms has been validated by courts all over the world, including the landmark 1926 
decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 385-88 (1926).  
 144. For the thick U.S. case law on “regulatory takings” and other types of constitutionally invalid 
exercises of the power of land use regulation, see ROBERT C. ELLICKSON ET AL., LAND USE CONTROLS 
83-240 (4th ed., 2013).  
 145. I do not address here the jurisprudential and conceptual questions of whether a judicial decision 
could ever amount to a taking of property. See Amnon Lehavi, Judicial Review of Judicial Lawmaking, 
96 MINN. L. REV. 520 (2011); Ilya Somin, Stop the Beach Renourishment and the Problem of Judicial 
Takings, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 91 (2011).    
 146. See generally LEHAVI, GLOBALIZING, supra note 135, at 74-89. 
 147. Hutten-Czapska v. Poland, App. No. 35014/97, ¶ 167 (Grand Chamber, Judgment, June 19, 
2006). 
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principle of proportionality in the context of authorizing courts by statute 
to establish ex lege trusts to consider the following:  
In assessing compliance with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the Court must 
make an overall examination of the various interests in issue, bearing in 
mind that the Convention is intended to safeguard rights that are “practical 
and effective.” It must look behind appearances and investigate the realities 
of the situation complained of.148   
It is exactly this need to make sure that property rights are practical and 
effective—especially when the underlying goal of creating an ex lege trust 
is to promote principally the interests of the co-owners as a group rather 
than those of the general public or external parties—that justifies the 
enactment of statutory provisions authorizing courts, in appropriate cases, 
to set up a multi-beneficiary trust to resolve a property deadlock and to 
establish its basic terms and conditions. 
Accordingly, the transformation of the proprietary interest from 
ownership or entitlement to that of a beneficiary calls to “look behind 
appearances” so as to realize the goal of establishing such an ex lege trust 
that serves the interests of the beneficiaries as a group in an impartial 
manner. The authorized court should be entrusted with the task of 
investigating “the realities of the situation” prior to deciding whether to 
exercise its discretion and order the establishment of the trust.  
In so doing, the court should make sure that no other solution would be 
more appropriate, having given due regard to the different interests of the 
parties. If the court then concludes that a trustee should be appointed to 
govern the assets in an effective and truly impartial manner toward all 
beneficiaries, while being subject to subsequent review and further 
guidance by the court, then such an exercise of the statutory authority is 
constitutionally valid and is by no means a taking. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In operation for centuries, Anglo-American trust law has proven to be 
a pragmatic and innovative legal instrument for the governance of assets 
whenever conventional property models are ineffective or inappropriate. 
While traditionally, trust law has been prominently associated with the 
voluntary gratuitous trust, the trust has been employed over time to deal 
with many other scenarios. Usage of trust law spans from commercial 
arrangements allowing persons to collaborate in investment or other 
financial activities, such as the bond indenture, to a limited number of 
statutory trusts, by which a court-appointed trustee intervenes and 
actively manages or distributes property among claimants, such as in the 
 
 148. Id. at ¶168.  
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case of insolvency or intestacy. The thick body of norms developed in 
trust law, which can either complement or fill in the contractual rules on 
fiduciary governance of assets, can be utilized to provide solutions for 
types of property problems that cannot be readily resolved by other 
means.  
Trust law offers a new institutional approach for dealing with property 
deadlocks among multiple stakeholders whenever the partition of the 
asset or estate among the stakeholders is either impracticable or otherwise 
suboptimal for the group. While other solutions, such as governance by 
direct majority vote or incorporation, are commonly used to allow for the 
effective governance of assets in the face of multiplicity of stakeholders 
and potential frictions, these cannot always be employed—especially 
when such internal conflicts do not allow for the consensual creation of a 
more effective mode of governance. At the same time, employing strong 
top-down coercion, such as by the power of eminent domain, embodies a 
harsh infringement of property rights. The creation of an open-ended form 
of statutory trust, authorizing a court to set up in appropriate cases a multi-
beneficiary trust to resolve a property deadlock for indivisible assets, 
offers a new mechanism for unified asset governance, while also 
considering the diverse interests of the various stakeholders. 
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